Abstract
High-level waste volume minimization currently requires the addition of organic compounds to precipitate Cs from the high volume of supernate. In addition, the alkaline nature of the waste requires pretreatment of the waste prior to introduction to the melter, which then calcines and vitrifies simultaneously. These pretreatment operations in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) can release hydrogen, benzene, ammonia, and carbon monoxide, which could, under upset conditions, result in flammable mixtures. The design of the facility has accounted for accidents of this nature and provides defense in depth for prevention. Use of the DWPF process for direct vitrification of PuO2, is not recommended due to the significant required design changes to ensure criticality safety. However, cans of PuO2in ceramic matrix, which are subsequently placed in a DWPF canister prior to high level waste glass being poured, appear to introduce no new significant safety issues.
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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Beranek, F. (1999). DWPF Vitrification Safety Issues. In: Jardine, L.J., Moshkov, M.M. (eds) Nuclear Materials Safety Management Volume II. NATO Science Series, vol 27. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4501-5_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4501-5_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-5891-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-4501-5
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