Abstract
Theories which address the interaction between political decision makers and (bureaucratic) implementation agencies using quantitative models are relevant to a modeling approach to policy implementation. the neo-classical models of bureaucracy are a logical starting point. the fundamental contrasts between the goals of political decision makers and implementation agencies form the basis of analysis in these models (for an overview see Van den Doel and Van Velthoven, 1993). These contrasts have consequences for the interaction between political decision makers and implementation agencies.
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Notes
That choice need not be the ‘best’ choice in a normative or ethical sense. the theory does not require a judgment on the values which an individual or organization holds (cf. Brecht, 1959), or on the behavior resulting from an individual calculation. This has led to criticism. Etzioni, for example, notes indignantly: ‘[S]uch a generalized definition of rationality makes madmen rational’ (1988: 40). He continues angrily: ‘[W]orms, whose behavior is determined by genetic codes, might be much more consistent than human beings. (…) There appears to be little merit for a concept that cannot differentiate between the intellectual capabilities of low species and human beings’ (Etzioni, 1988: 143). the point is that the behavior of worms and madmen can perhaps be explained well by treating them as if they are rational.
Implementation agencies can use this knowledge to manipulate the policy agenda of political decision makers, so that the demand for service provision appears greater than it is in reality. This leads to large budget allocations for these services.
According to Breton and Wintrobe (1982: 62ff), implementation agencies can indeed be followed during implementation using networks within the government organization, in which the members of implementation agencies trust each other or, if deviant behavior is shown, take sanctions against each other. Competition within and between implementation agencies can force these agencies to reveal their real behavior to political decision makers, so that they are forced to supply the services determined by the market (cf. Tullock, 1976: 118-119; Van den Doel and Van Velthoven, 1993). Competition works only if there is free access to the supply of government services. However, such free access is not easily realizable. Many specialist tasks demand large initial investments. In addition, operating in a small ‘market’ is often unprofitable, whereby providers of public services are also legally obliged to perform certain tasks.
Bendor and Moe (1985: 766) argue that the focus on this ultimate goal can be explained by the fact that economic models of bureaucratic behavior originate in models of the behavior of companies: ‘In their motivational assumptions for bureaus, the standard formal models have clearly been influenced by the analogy of profit-or revenue-maximizing firms. Hence the emphasis on budgets and slack. But although it is ordinarily true enough that firms are not directly motivated by output, this is less plausible for bureaus, for there is good evidence that bureaucratic officials are often motivated by policy preferences.’
The models of decision making and implementation assume that implementation agencies attach an unchangeable level of salience to issues, and take unchangeable policy positions on these issues. However, this assumption is in conflict with the fact that (a) socio-economic, ideological and technical circumstances change, and also that (b) values and norms can change between decision making and implementation. If changes in policy preferences are considered, the policy implementation has an unpredictable character. In accordance with this, Lazin (1994: 110) reported that the implementation of the local social renewal in Israel encountered serious difficulties after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, because this invasion undermined the priority of the policy program. the actions of implementers may become unacceptable societally, as a result of which adjustments are unavoidable (Berman, 1980). New knowledge from scientific research sometimes leads to a re-evaluation of political decisions (Sabatier, 1987: 676-680; Torenvlied and Jakobs, 1994: 113-115). In order to deal with such events, new political decisions must be taken and new theoretical analyses of their subsequent implementation can be conducted.
This concerns both the highly motivated and less motivated implementation agencies. Political control which is exercised on motivated organization can unintentionally have counter-productive effects (cf. Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). This complicating relationship will not be explored further.
Coleman (1990: 294) describes norms as ‘devices for controlling actions in the interest of persons other than the actor.’ the behavior compelled by the norm leads to outcomes which are more optimal for other groups or for the larger group of which the individual is a member.
Much attention is devoted to selection processes in the neo-institutional literature. by means of particular selection mechanisms, contracting parties can be identified which are expected to adhere to the conditions of the agreement.
This variation in the extent of sanctioning is a problem for these researchers because they are intent on formulating a model of political control which explains why policy deviations are entirely absent.
This theory was later formally modeled by Banks and Weingast (1992). This model is based on the strict assumption that political decision makers will select ‘those [agencies] where the relevant constituents have a low cost of access to information’ (Banks and Weingast, 1992). by using the fire alarm strategy, the costs of control are moved from the decision makers to the interest groups. As is the case with judicial control, the effectiveness of procedural control differs between implementation agencies depending on the extent to which the interest groups are organized. Banks and Weingast’s model leads to an interesting interpretation of bureaucratic inefficiency. the model shows that this inefficiency is introduced on purpose by political decision makers: (a) implementation agencies must comply with time consuming procedures in order to provide interest groups with information, and also to give these groups a hearing; (b) less efficient agencies are preferred to more efficient agencies if the costs of controlling the former are lower.
This room for discretion need not be judged negatively. Vaguely formulated decisions provide implementers with room to apply these decisions in different situations. Tight regulations destroy the flexibility of implementers, and lead to a rigid application of political decisions in changing situations.
The concept of sensitivity to control distinguished in this research originates in the same factors as the concept of ‘information-induced discretion’.
The former Dutch minister Marcel van Dam (1995) uses the term ‘limits of political toleration’ to indicate that a partner in the governing coalition, D66, refused to indicate where it drew the line between acceptable and unacceptable actions by ‘its’ Minister of Justice in a crisis concerning methods of criminal investigation.
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Torenvlied, R. (2000). Implementers Constrained?. In: Political Decisions and Agency Performance. Library of Public Policy and Public Administration, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4285-4_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4285-4_2
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