On Emotion and Self-Determination In Max Scheler and Antoni KęPpiński

Abstract

Although the philosophical theories of emotion and feeling have a long history¹ one could be under the impression that, in contrast to vast amount of analyses devoted to thinking and willing, the emotional sphere of a human being has been rather underestimated if not neglected in philosophy. Of course there are some exceptions to this tendency, but there can be no doubt that the realm of emotion has been explored much more profoundly in literature, poetry and art. Among the problems concerning the philosophy of emotion the following seem to be of particular importance: the nature of emotion, the place and the role of emotion within the theory of a human being and the objects of emotions.² Yet other problems concern the significance of emotions for ethics. Some authors tend to exclude emotions from the sphere of ethics, whereas some place them in the centre of moral life. Among the latter a particular position is held by those who base their ethical theories on emotion and resort to emotion in order to explain the nature of valuation. I shall concentrate on these theories. One of the reasons for my interest in them is the fact that they could receive strong support in what is given in phenomena. The writers who hold such theories often tend also to ascribe the fundamental role to the emotions within the frameworks of their philosophies of man, and this view also has strong support in phenomena.