Abstract
The aim of the present chapter is to discuss the extent to which it proves meaningful to apply co-management theory in explaining compliance with regulations among fishermen in the Barents Sea.1 Moreover, the results arrived at so far in the investigation are used to further study the relationship between the concepts of co-management, communities and compliance. An attempt is made to provide an explanation in line with McCay & Jentoft’s (1998) call for thicker descriptions in studies of the commons, taking into account the embeddedness of management systems in more general social systems.2
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Notes
The chapter is a revised version of Hønneland (1999d).
It can be argued that it is difficult to provide a thick description in one chapter. However, the present chapter should be viewed in the context of the information presented in the other chapters of the book.
A further discussion of co-management in Northwest Russian fisheries is provided in Hønneland & Nilssen (2000).
For more detailed presentations of Northwest Russian fishing industry and management, see Homeland (1998a) or H0nneland & Nilssen (2000).
Understood as those actors located in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk oblasti as well as the Karelian autonomous republic. Since 1991, Karelia has enjoyed status as a republic.
The former was incorporated in the “Sevryba” structure whereas the latter stood outside it.
The Northwest Russian collective fleet — itself a remnant of the Soviet system — has at its disposal less than 10% of the Russian Barents Sea quota.
In our interviews with representatives of the “Sevryba” administration, they used to complain until the mid-1990s that the member enterprises did not comply with their orders and inform them about their activities. Since then, they seem to have accepted this change as a fait accompli and have concentrated on retaining their influence in the management process, and subsequently on their new-found role as a “small shipowner” (see below).
The internal quotas of Arkhangelsk and Kareliya are distributed in their respective regional Fishery Councils. Murmansk is, however, by far the most important fishery region in Northwestern Russia.
Many former fishing collectives (kolkhozy) were reorganised into joint stock companies after 1992 and are today members of “The Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North”.
In addition, the regional administration probably saw a possibility of introducing payment for quota shares.
Care should, however, be taken in the interpretation of the interview data. Both individual fishermen and representatives of the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association may be interested in portraying fishermen in general as responsible citizens. This issue is returned to in Chapter 8. However, there is no evidence to the contrary of our general assumption that most fishermen comply with most rules most of the time.
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Hønneland, G. (2000). Co-management and Communities in the Barents Sea Fisheries. In: Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources. Environment & Policy, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4044-7_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4044-7_7
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