Abstract
As mentioned in Chapter 1, personal in-depth interviews were carried out with Norwegian and Russian fishermen in order to further test the preliminary conclusions arrived at through the study of statistical material and observation. The results of that investigation are rendered in the present chapter. The main issue is how fishermen perceive their relationship with the most important management bodies, and how they account for the largely compliant behaviour that statistics give evidence to (cf. Chapter 5). The answers are here structured thematically, and not categorised by type of interviewee (Norwegian fishermen; Norwegian fisher representatives; Russian fishermen).1
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Notes
Chapter 8 provides a discussion of the typical answers within each of these categories of interviewees.
My intention was originally to carry out a written survey with fixed-choice answers for the purpose of testing the hypotheses in question. This idea was rejected at an early stage due to practical difficulties in reaching the fishermen (particularly the Russians, who are at sea for three months at a time) and the negative experience of other Norwegian researchers from similar surveys (low response rate). Russian fishery researchers in Murmansk, for their part, warned me that Russian fishermen would almost certainly not answer a survey due partly to the general unfamiliarity of Russians with being subjected to social science research. During my interviews with fishermen, I have occasionally mentioned my initial plan of conducting a written survey. Without exception, the interviewees have laughed at this piece of information and confirmed my suspicion that they would not have bothered to answer.
Cf. Kystvaktens årsrapporter 1992-98 (Annual reports of the Norwegian Coast Guard 1992–98).
The interviews were performed together with my colleague Anne-Kristin Jørgensen, who was working on a comparative study of the Norwegian and Russian enforcement systems in the Barents Sea fisheries. Two of the interviews with Russian fishermen were for practical purposes carried out by her alone, but incorporated the questions specific to my study. One of the interviews with fisher representatives was performed together with Stig Standli Gezelius of the University of Oslo, who is working on similar questions related to the Northeast and Northwest Atlantic fisheries.
On the other hand, it raised the dilemma whether and how I should account for my own background from the Coast Guard. While it can be argued that it would have been unethical to hide the fact that I had worked there, telling it might make the interviewees produce more favourable statements about this institution than would otherwise have been the case. As a compromise, I chose to account for it when it proved natural in the given social setting. Some of the interviews evolved in a way that made it natural to use some time to explain both the research agenda and my own background rather elaborately already at the outset. On other occasions, the interviewee would start talking right after the topic had been introduced, and it would seem unnatural to interrupt him to inform him that I once was an interpreter in the Coast Guard. In fact, this piece of information might have been perceived as rather untimely by the interviewee and made him wonder whether it contained some kind of hidden message (indicating that my background should influence his answers). In these interviews, my experience from the Coast Guard, as well as more detailed information on my investigation, would come up at various points during the conversation. Interestingly, interviewees from both categories of interviews (those whom I told initially about my Coast Guard background, and those that were told about it later in the interview) told very similar stories. Although not examined systematically, this strengthens the reliability of my data.
A typical interview lasted approximately one hour; however, they varied from three quarters of an hour to a couple of hours. I chose not to use a tape recorder for fear of intimidating my interviewees — especially the Russian ones — on such a delicate issue as compliance. I have developed a rather quick handwriting, however, and took care to record important statements as literally as possible. Moreover, the fact that we were two interviewers at most of the interviews gave us the opportunity to compare notes afterwards.
The remainder of this chapter is based on Hønneland (2000).
A majority of Russian fishermen, for instance, express irritation about the fact that the Norwegian Coast Guard does not accept the scales used by Russian fishermen. A few of the Norwegian fisher representatives argue that vessels with certain gear types (e.g. autoliners) are inspected too frequently as compared to other vessel groups. The Norwegian fishermen, on their part, are most discontented with the procedure for closing and opening of fishing grounds. However, this is not the responsibility of the Coast Guard (cf. Chapter 4) and will thus not be further discussed here.
“They have to be here; it’s good that they are here; there’s only one thing: send them on better training; one of them confused flounder and halibut!” (Norwegian fisherman) The inspectors of the Coast Guard are navy officers with additional training as fishery inspectors.
One exception is a Russian captain who argues that compared to the Russian enforcement body, the Norwegian Coast Guard is excessively concerned with revealing violations and not helpful enough in tracing the fish: “Norway has decided to find all violators and punish them; it’s not the right thing to do.”
The Norwegian Coast Guard was established in its present form in 1977.
Geir Osen; commander of the North Norwegian Coast Guard branch at Sortland during the period 1995-99.
To further illustrate this, a Norwegian fisher representative recounted that in a specific harbour there are two inspectors from the Fish Control; everybody prefers to be controlled by one of them, not because he is more lenient in his work than the other, but because he is more reasonable in his attitude towards the fishermen. Moreover, a Norwegian fisherman typically warns the Coast Guard against participating in anti-smuggling actions against Russian trawlers together with the Customs service: “The Coast Guard creates its own negative image through largescale actions against the Russians; [...] there were Rambo-types with bullet-proof vests from the Customs; now they were looking for liquor, but these are the things that will be associated with the Coast Guard; and later the same people show up as inspectorsl”
As was the case with the Fish Control, the dissatisfaction with the Surveillance of Fishing Grounds is also related to the fact that fishermen do not feel their arguments and knowledge are welcome here. Several of the Norwegian respondents reported concrete events when they felt the Surveillance made decisions on an incorrect or incomplete basis; they had contacted its leadership in Tromsø, but did not feel that they were interested in listening to their arguments. Typically, they proposed that the responsibility for closing and opening of fishing grounds should be transferred to the Coast Guard.
Referring to the so-called “trawl ladder”, established by the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association in 1994 as a tool for distributing quota shares between ocean and coastal vessels.
Referring to repeated refusals by Russian authorities in 1997 and 1998 to applications from Norwegian and Russian marine scientists for joint scientific expeditions in the Russian zone of the Barents Sea.
Since 1994, all foreign vessels fishing in the Norwegian EEZ have had to report for inspection at check-points along the coast when entering and leaving the zone.
Interestingly, the investigation of statistics from the Norwegian Coast Guard which indicate a high level of compliance (cf. Chapter 5) concerns the years 1986-92, when the quotas of Norwegian-Arctic cod and haddock were extremely low.
Referring to the unregulated fishery in the Barents Sea Loophole by Icelandic and others under flags of convenience since 1993; cf. Chapter 4.
Cf. above.
The issue of reliability and validity of the interview data is further discussed in Chapter 8.
This is the assumption of the public choice tradition in the study of the commons; cf. Chapters 2 and 3.
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Hønneland, G. (2000). How Fishermen Account for Compliance. In: Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources. Environment & Policy, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4044-7_6
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