The Possibility of Acceptance Without Belief

Abstract

My topic is the problem of determining whether it is possible for a person to accept a proposition without believing it, to accept, for example, that a table in a room is four feet long but not believe this to be true, or to accept but not believe that the universe originated with a big bang. I don’t think it is possible to have acceptance without belief, but this is in opposition to some writers who think it is, and we must look at their reasoning. It should be noted that the argument before us is restricted to propositional belief and does not extend to the relationship between acceptance and non-propositional believing in (or having faith in, placing trust in) something or someone. Corning to believe in something seems to be a species of acceptance, and as such some of the contrasts to acceptance outlined below fail to apply.

Before tackling our problem head on I want to lay some grounds for a solution by first considering the data we appeal to in making our various claims about acceptance and belief, and then reviewing in some contrasts that seem to suggest our being able to separate the two.