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The Simulation of Belief

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Believing and Accepting

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 83))

Abstract

In his book on Symbolism (Sperber 1974) Sperber distinguished between two modes of evaluation for sentences. In the normal, descriptive mode we first determine which proposition the sentence expresses; then we evaluate the resulting proposition as true or false. Interpretation precedes truth-evaluation. In the symbolic or hermeneutic mode, truth-evaluation takes place first. The sentence is assigned the value’ true’ before interpretation, and it is the knowledge of the sentence’s truth which guides interpretation. (In current philosophical terminology, we know that the sentence is true, but we don’t know which truth it expresses.)

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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Recanati, F. (2000). The Simulation of Belief. In: Engel, P. (eds) Believing and Accepting. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 83. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4042-3_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4042-3_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5782-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-4042-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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