Context, content And reference — the case for beliefs and intentionality

Abstract

During the last couple of decades the views and assumptions of so called Folk Psychology about our cognition and action have come under attack in North American philosophy of mind. These are the common sense views and assumptions we hold about ourselves and our fellow human beings to the effect that we are rational agents whose actions are motivated by and, thus, may be explained in terms of, our knowledge, beliefs, desires and related propositional attitudes. For example, according to Folk Psychology the fact that on my way to work this morning I carried an umbrella, may be explained by referring to my knowledge or belief that it was raining, my desire not to become wet, and my belief that an umbrella would protect me from becoming wet. And it is part of the assumptions of Folk Psychology that our every day descriptions and cognition of ourselves and the ways in which our beliefs and desires motivate our action are generally correct, and that we are very often correct when ascribing such mental states and motives to other people.

“It is a curiosity of the philosophical temperament, this passion for radical solutions. Do you feel a little twinge in your espitomology? Absolute scepticism is the thing to try. Has the logic of confirmation got you down? Probably physics is a fiction. […] Nobody has yet suggested that the way out of the Liar paradox is to give up talking, but I expect it’s only a matter of time. Apparently the rule is: if aspirin doesn’t work, try cutting off your head”