The Theory of Scientific Inquiry

Abstract

We live in a world in which social problems are at times created, constrained, and/or resolved by persons engaged in scientific inquiry. Such problems are commonly perceived as prevailing conditions that in some demonstrable sense require institutional remedies, i.e. changes in behavioral rules. “What is” is not “what ought to be.” Indeed the referential content of a “social problem” cannot be conceived except through recourse to some standard, some criterion, that distinguishes between “is” and “ought.” Certainly one of the revolutionary contributions of Foster, and therefore one of the main foci of this volume, is his demonstration that, in the social process, questions of “oughtness,” criteria of value, can be scientifically explored! A social science is both possible and essential. We need not, indeed must not be, dependent on cultural certitudes, utilitarian preferences, nationalistic icons, transcendentalistic axioms, or other non-evidential bases as the source of criteria of judgment if rational comprehension and enhancement of the human condition is to continue and accelerate. The central function of economics as a social science is, in Foster’s view, to explain causal relationships and make policy recommendations concerning “the provision of the means of human life and experience.” He explains,

The most obtrusive distinguishing attribute of man is his rational capacity.

J. Fagg Foster