Abstract
According to the received view in semantics, so-called unbound pronouns — pronouns not bound by a quantifier Q inside the smallest clause containing Q — should either be treated as abbreviations for the antecedent clause, or as variables bound by a dynamic existential quantifier. Geach’s notorious Hob-Nob sentences, exemplifying intentional identity attributions, have always been a threat to this assumption. In a recent series of insightful papers (Edelberg 1986, 1992, 1995), Edelberg has also challenged the traditional realist conception of semantics, according to which sentences denote propositions that are true or false in the actual world. He argues that if we look at both de re belief attributions and at attitude attributions of intentional identity, a perspectivalist semantic theory will be more economical than a realist one. According to Edelberg’s perspectivalist semantic theory, what is expressed by a sentence is not said to be true or false in a world, but true or false relative to a theory or belief state. In this paper I will discuss how successfully the problems can be handled in terms of the traditional assumptions. I will argue that (i) a realist account of de re attributions and Hob-Nob sentences need not really be more complex than the perspectival account proposed by Edelberg, but also that (ii) the realistic and externalistic dimension is crucial for a proper account of intentional identity attributions. On the other hand, I will suggest that the phenomenon does show the limits of the received doctrine with respect to the analysis of so-called unbound pronouns.
This paper was mostly written while I was a member of the Forschungsgruppe ‘Logic in Philosophy’ at the University of Tübingen, and finished while I was working for the ’Sources and Streams of Information’ project sponsered by the Dutch organisation for scientific research (NWO). I would like to thank Hans Kamp, Paul Dekker, and especially Ede Zimmermann for discussion, and Ben Shear for correcting my English.
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van Rooy, R. (2000). Anaphoric Relations Across Attitude Contexts. In: von Heusinger, K., Egli, U. (eds) Reference and Anaphoric Relations. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, vol 72. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3947-2_9
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