The Conservative Model of Deliberation

Abstract

Both in England and in the United States, the dominant conservative tradition managed to organize a decision-making process based on a peculiar epistemic assumption: the idea that monological reflection represented the best device for defining impartial decisions. From a radical point of view, this very assumption affected the whole structure of the decision-rnaking process. In their opinion, the search for impartiality required just the opposite: a process of collective, common deliberation. How can impartiality be achieved -the radicals wondered- if you restrict (instead of encouraging), the people’s chances to get together and express their views? The conservatives seemed to have clear answers to these types of questions. Defending their view, for example, they tended to affirm things like the following: “You cannot claim to be defending impartiality if the system that you defend is ready to transform ‘hasty,’ ‘passionate’ decisions into law. We were concerned about this risk, and tried to prevent it. Mainly because of this concern, we tried to create institutions that secured a “more sedate” reflection, a more reasoned discussion. In the end, the institutional system that we supported favored the achievement of impartiality, by encouraging a more adequate process of political deliberation.”