Abstract
Many philosophers underestimate the general disillusionment in the philosophical outlook on science caused, in part, by Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The challenge presented by Hume’s problem of induction has always kept the issue of scientific truth at the forefront of philosophical research. Philosophers expended great energy in defending a broad spectrum of replies to Hume’s scepticism, ranging from the view that theories are merely instruments for the control and prediction of nature, to realist views of science (which hold that science aims at the truth about the world, and is rational in the pursuit of this goal).
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Forster, M.R. (2000). Hard Problems in the Philosophy of Science: Idealisation and Commensurability. In: Nola, R., Sankey, H. (eds) After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3935-9_9
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