Abstract
There are two chief tasks which confront the philosophy of scientific method. The first task is to specify the methodology which serves as the objective ground for scientific theory appraisal and acceptance. The second task is to explain how application of this methodology leads to advance toward the aim(s) of science. In other words, the goal of the theory of method is to provide an integrated explanation of both rational scientific theory choice and scientific progress.1
This paper was written while I held a Visiting Fellowship at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. I wish to express my gratitude to the Center for the invitation, as well as for hospitality and support during my visit. For discussion, I am grateful to audiences at the Center for Philosophy of Science, as well as at the University of Hanover, the Catholic University of Louvain and Swarthmore College, where I presented talks based on this material. For comments, discussion and correspondence relating to the ideas contained in this paper, I am indebted to Thomas Bonk, John Clendinnen, David Cockburn, Michel Ghins, Bruce Glymour, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Hugh Lacey, Larry Laudan, Jim Lennox, Timothy Lyons, Michele Marsonet, Robert Nola, Stathis Psillos and Nick Rescher.
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Sankey, H. (2000). Methodological Pluralism, Normative Naturalism and the Realist Aim of Science. In: Nola, R., Sankey, H. (eds) After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3935-9_8
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