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A Selective Survey of Theories of Scientific Method

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After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend

Part of the book series: Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science ((AUST,volume 15))

Abstract

For some, the whole idea of a theory of scientific method is yester-year’s debate, the continuation of which can be summed up as yet more of the proverbial deceased equine castigation. We beg to differ. There are reasons for the negative view, however, some of which will be canvassed in this selective survey of the territory the debate about theories of method has traversed in the second half of the twentieth century. The territory is very wide-ranging. It is hard to find a perspective from which one can get an overall view. If one focuses on one part of the philosophical debate about method then others go out of focus or do not come into view at all. What will be attempted here is a number of snapshots of the philosophical landscape which hopefully convey, if not the whole picture, something of the debate over method that has taken place.

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Nola, R., Sankey, H. (2000). A Selective Survey of Theories of Scientific Method. In: Nola, R., Sankey, H. (eds) After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3935-9_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3935-9_1

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