Abstract
This paper does not discuss Quine’s important contributions to philosophy. I shall explore a topic Quine has not discussed much, namely decision-making. I hope Quine will appreciate my naturalism; he has done more than anyone to put naturalism at centre stage.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Ainslie, George. Picoeconomics, Cambridge 1992.
—. “Beyond Microeconomics”, in Jon Elster (ed) The Multiple Self, Cambridge, 1986.
—. “Hyberbolic Discounting”, (with Nick Haslam) in George Loewenstein and Jon Elster (eds) Choice over Time, Russell Sage Foundation, 1992.
“Self-Control” (with Nick Haslam) in Loewenstein and Elster.
—. “Where There’s a Will There’s a Won’t” Unpublished Manuscript 1993, Presentation for the Symposium Contemporary Perspectives on Self-Control and Drug-Dependence, Chicago 1993.
Bratman, Michael, Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will, NOUS, 1979.
—. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason, 1987.
—. “Planning and temptation”, in May, Friedman and Clarke (eds) Minds and Morals, Bradford Books, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 293–310.
Charles, David. Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action. Duckworth, London, 1984.
Davidson, Donald, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980.
—. “Paradoxes of Irrationality”, in Richard Wollheim and James Hopkins (eds) Philosophical Essays on Freud, Cambridge 1982.
—. “Deception and Division”, in Elster (ed) The Multiple Self, Cambridge, 1985.
Gjelsvik, Olav “Intention and Alternatives”, Philosophical Studies, 1996, pp. 159-177.
Irwin, Terence “Aristotelian Actions”, Phronesis, 1986.
Pears, David. Motivated Irrationality, OUP, Oxford, 1984.
Quattrone, George A. and Tversky, Amos: “Self-Deception and the Voter’s Paradox”, in Jon Elster, (ed) The Multiple Self Cambridge 1985, pp. 35-58.
W.V. Quine. Theories and Things. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1981.
Scheffler, Samuel, Human Morality, OUP, Oxford 1992.
Stich, Stephen The Fragmentation of Reason, MIT-Press, Bradford Books, Cambridge, 1993.
Strawson, Peter F. “Freedom and Resentment”, in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. London, Methuen, 1974.
—. Scepticism and Naturalism. Some Varieties. OUP, Oxford 1986.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gjelsvik, O. (2000). The Epistemology of Decision-Making “Naturalised”. In: Orenstein, A., Kotatko, P. (eds) Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 210. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3933-5_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3933-5_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-0253-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-3933-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive