Abstract
“Holism” has become a “buzz-word” of contemporary philosophy. It figures prominently in current discussions in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and epistemology. However, as is frequently the case with “buzz-words,” its meaning rarely remains fixed from context to context or even within a single context.
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This essay was first published in Wittgenstein and Quine, edited by Robert L. Arrington and Hans-Johann Glock (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 80-96, and is reprinted here with the kind permission of the editors and the publisher.
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Notes
W.V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” In Quine From Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2d ed. rev. 1980), p. 41.
See W.V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1960), p. 13n.
W.V. Quine, “On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World,” Erkenntnis 9 (1975), p. 313.
See W.V. Quine, “In Praise of Observation Sentences,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XC, No. 3 (1993), pp. 107–116.
See Roger F. Gibson, Jr., Enlightened Empiricism (Tampa: University of South Florida Press, 1988), pp. 33–42.
W.V. Quine, “Reply to Robert Nozick.” In The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, L.E. Hahn and P.A. Schilpp, eds. (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Press, 1986), p. 364.
See W.V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992, rev. ed.), p. 16.
See W.V. Quine, Methods of Logic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982, 4th ed.), p. 2. Also, see “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” p. 43.
W.V. Quine, “Two Dogmas in Retrospect,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 21, No. 3 (September, 1991), p. 269. Observation categoricals are standing sentences composed of two holophrastic observation sentences of the form “Whenever this, that”: “Whenever it’s raining, it’s wet.”
W.V. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized.” In Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 80–81.
W.V. Quine, “The Scope and Langauge of Science.” In Quine The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976 rev. and enlarged ed.), p. 229.
G.E. Moore, “A Defense of Common Sense.” In Moore Philosophical Papers (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959), p. 33.
See Avrum Stroll, Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty (Oxford: University Press, 1994), p. 114.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, eds. (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), p. 21e.
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Gibson, R.F. (2000). Quine, Wittgenstein, and Holism. In: Orenstein, A., Kotatko, P. (eds) Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 210. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3933-5_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3933-5_7
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