Abstract
Discussing the differences between the natural sciences and what he termed the sciences of man, society and the state, Dilthey acknowledged Comte’s discovery that progress in the sciences moved on a line of logical dependence.1 The more complex sciences rested upon simpler ones: mechanics combined its own inductions with deductions from mathematics; physics depended upon both these simpler sciences. Though true in the natural sciences, Dilthey insisted that Comte’s formula could not be applied to the sciences of man, society and the state. These sciences instead were shaped by political and social developments — “discords in state and society, the aggressive force of interests wielded through public opinion”.2 Indeed Dilthey believed that Comte’s theory illustrated this very truth, for in arguing for the scientific supremacy of sociology, Comte was taking a political position. He was replacing the primacy of the state with the primacy of society. His theory was the political expression of the new European proletariat, for whom the state was merely an agency of class rule.3
I am indebted to Dr. Helmut Johach of the Erlangen-Nürnberg University for his comments on an early draft of this paper.
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Notes
In his Introduction to the Human Sciences (Einleitung in die Geisteswissenaften), the term Human Sciences was a broad designation that included aesthetics, philosophy and religion, but Dilthey’s main concern was man, society and the state. Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. I: Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Stuttgart, 1959). In 1875 he had published a preliminary version of the later work, entitled, “On the Study of the History of the Sciences of Man, Society and the State”. Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. V: Die Geistige Welt: Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens “Über das Studium der Geschichte der Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der Gesellschaft und dem Staat”. (Stuttgart, 1961).
“Über das Studium”, 32,50–52.
Einleitung, 83–84.
Einleitung, 4, Helmut Johach has argued that a marked change occurred in the last decade of Dilthey’s life. In Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften Dilthey stressed philosophy over social science. The main problematic became understanding Geist in its timeless validity rather than demarcating the social sciences. Dilthey retreated from his commitment to shape politics and society, to an universalistic and quasi-aesthetic contemplation of timeless Geist. Helmut Johach, Handelnder Mensch und objektiver Geist: Zur Theorie der Geistes – und Sozialwissenschaften bei Wilhelm Dilthey (Meisenheim am Glan, 1974), 62, 76–77, 115.
“Über das Studium” 35. Elsewhere Dilthey refers to “the social ethic the present aspires to”. Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XIV: Leben Schleiermachers. Zweiter Band: Schleiermachers System als Philosophie und Theologie. Zwei Haibände (Berlin, 1967), 369.
Berliner Entwurf. Nach c. 76, fol. 20, Rücks kursiv v.V. Quoted in Johach, 97. The unpublished Entwurf was written in 1890–95 to conclude the Einleitung. Johach, 89–90.
Ulrich Herrmann, Die Pädagogik Wilhelm Diltheys (Gottingen, 1971), 344. The quote comes from Dilthey’s unpublished lecture notes.
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. V: “Das Wesen der Philosophie”, 409.
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XVII: Zur Geistesgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Review of “Rowland G. Hazard, Zwei Briefe über Verursachung und Freiheit im Woltem, gerichtet an John Stuart Mill”. (Göttingen, 1974), 363. For Mill’s reception in Germany and Dilthey’s image of Mill, see my “John Stuart Mill: A View from the Bismarckian Reich”, The Mill Newsletter XII (Winter, 1977), 3–18.
“Über das Studium”, 42–43, 56–60.
Einleitung, 113, 222–24. Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II: Weltanschaung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation. “Die Autonomie des Denkens, der Konstruktive Rationalismus und der Pantheistische Monismus nach ihrem Zusamenhang im 17. Jahrhundert”, (Stuttgart, 1957), 244–45.
On Rousseau, see Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VIII: Weltanschaungslehre “Die Kultur der Gegenwart und die Philosophie”, (Stuttgart, 1960), 203–04. Sigirid Schulenburg (ed.), Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Paul Yorck v. Wartenburg 1877–1897 (Halle, 1923), 239.
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VI: Die Geistige Welt “Die Einbildungskraft des Dichters”, (Stuttgart, 1962), 240.
Einleitung, 108.
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XII: Zur Preussischen Geschichte “Schleiermachers politische Gesinnung und Wirksamkeit”, (Stuttgart, 1960), 5–9.
Leben Schleiermachers, 243, 276, 370.
Leben Schleiermachers, 235, 245, 368.
Leben Schleiermachers, 370–72, 365.
Leben Schleiermachers, 369.
Clara Misch geb. Dilthey (ed.), Der Junge Dilthey: Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebüchern, 1852–1870. (Stuttgart, 1960), 142–43.
Clara Misch geb. Dilthey (ed.), Der Junge Dilthey: Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebüchern, 1852–1870. (Stuttgart, 1960), 190.
Einleitung, 50–51.
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. IV: Pädagogik: Geschichte und Grundlinien Des Systems (Stuttgart, 1961), 192.
Erich Franz, Deutsche Klassik und Reformation (Haale/Saale, 1937), 367.
Einleitung, 83–84, 90.
Einleitung, 422. Dilthey’s opposition to sociology was to this version of the science, which viewed culture solely as the product of the social whole and ruled out both the individual and the state as autonomous entities. He considered sociology entirely legitimate so long as it allowed for the autonomy of other realms.
“Das Wesen”, 377. Einleitung, 423.
Einleitung, 100.
Einleitung, 74, 124. For Dilthey’s review of Schäffle’s, Bau und Leben des Sozialen Körpers, 1875, see Zur Geistesgeschichte des 19 Jahrhunderts, 42–43.I have translated “Fursichsein” as “free to be himself”. The term goes back to Kant and Hegel and connotes human will and freedom in contrast to the determinations of nature and the objective world. In contemporary usage the term suggests “authenticity”, “self-direction”.
“Über das Studium”, 35.
Einleitung, 128, 44. For a perceptive discussion of this theory, see Johach, 32–35.
Einleitung, 422, 49. Werner Cahnman, “Max Weber and the Methodological Controversy in the Social Sciences” Werner Cahnman and Alvin Boskoff (eds.), Sociology and History (New York, 1964), 121. Weber defined sociology as the study of “social action”, or action “meaningfully oriented to the action of others”, 108.
“Über das Studium”, 62–64. Einleitung, 31. For an illuminating discussion of the liberal conception of the Volksgeist, see Wolfgang Hock, Liberales Denken in Zeitalter der Pauls-Kirche (Münster, 1957), 50–51.
Julius Frankenberger, “Objektiver Geist und Völkerpsychologie”, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik, 154. (1914), 72–73. Moritz Lazarus und Heymann Steinthal were among the founders of “ethnopsychology” (Völkerpsychologie). Persuaded that psychology should not confine itself to the study of the individual consciousness, they posited a “group mind” not as an independent entity but as a functional explanation for the integration of individual minds. Both drew heavily from the study of language, mythology and comparative religion. Dilthey was close to both of them during the late 1850s and early 1860s. In his diaries he recorded his agreement with their ideas. Der junge Dilthey, 51, 69, 101.
Julius Frankenberger, “Objektiver Geist und Völkerpsychologie”, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik, 154. (1914), 156. Moritz Lazarus und Heymann Steinthal were among the founders of “ethnopsychology” (Völkerpsychologie). Persuaded that psychology should not confine itself to the study of the individual consciousness, they posited a “group mind” not as an independent entity but as a functional explanation for the integration of individual minds. Both drew heavily from the study of language, mythology and comparative religion. Dilthey was close to both of them during the late 1850s and early 1860s. In his diaries he recorded his agreement with their ideas. Der junge Dilthey, 51, 69, 101.
Einleitung, 47, 65–67. For the reference to “historic memories”, see Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XI: Vom Aufgang Des Geschichtlichen Bewusstseins, “Friedrich Christoph Schlosser”, (Stuttgart, 1960), 158. ‘Verbänd’ has no English equivalent. ‘Association’ is too loose and contractual; ‘social organism’ is too cohesive and monolithic. I shall employ the German terminology.
Hans-Joachim Lieber, “Geschichte und Gesellschaft Im Denken Diltheys”, Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie und Sozial-Psychologie, 17 (1965), 717.
Einleitung, 71.
Einleitung, 73. For Gierke’s equally warm approval of the Einleitung, see Otto Gierke, “Eine Grundlegung für die Geisteswissenschaften”, Preussische Jahrbücher, 53 (1884), 135–44. On Gierke, See John Lewis, The Genossenschaft-Theory of Otto von Gierke (Wisconsin, 1935), 28–31, 56–61. Ernest Barker “Introduction”, Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society (Boston, 1957), xxxi, viii, xviii–xix.
Otto Gierke, “Eine Grundlegung für die Geisteswissenschaften”, Preussische Jahrbücher, 53 (1884), 87.
Otto Gierke, “Eine Grundlegung für die Geisteswissenschaften”, Preussische Jahrbücher, 53 (1884), 82.
“Über das Studium”, 63.
Einleitung, 87, 65. Johach considers Dilthey’s views a striking anticipation of role theory in contemporary sociology. Johach, 86–87.
Einleitung, 77. For the Schleiermacher reference, see “Schleiermachers politische Gesinnung”, 8.
Einleitung, 84–86.
Lewis, 24, 39. Barker, xv, xxiv.
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XVI: Zur Geistesgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts “Ein System der Politik”, 109–13. For a similar criticism of Droysen, see Vol. XVII: Zur Geistesgeschichte, 78.
Otto Westphal, Feinde Bismarcks: Geistige Grundlager Der Deutschen Opposition, 1848–1918 (München, 1930), 164.
Einleitung, 86. Mohl was in a minority among liberals in his view of society’s autonomy. Politically his position led to the demand for a parliamentary régime. See Heinrich Heffter Die Deutsche Selbstverwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1950), 361.
Georg Iggers, The German Conception of History (Middletown, Connecticut, 1968), 107,. This view was common to the liberal “Prussian school” of historians.
Georg Iggers, The German Conception of History (Middletown, Connecticut, 1968), 113. This view was common to the liberal “Prussian school” of historians.
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. IX: Pädagogik “Grundlinien eines systems der Pädagogik”. (Stuttgart, 1960), 194–196.
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. IX: Pädagogik “Grundlinien eines systems der Pädagogik”. (Stuttgart, 1960), 196.
Über die Möglichkeit einer Allgemeingültigen Pädagogischen Wissenschaft “Entwurf einer Einleitung zur Geschichte des Preussischer Unterrichtswesen” (Weinheim, 1963), 80.
Briefwechsel, 142, 134–35. For Zedlitz’s educational and political goals, see Ernst Rudolf Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789. Vol. IV: Struktur und Krisen des Kaiserreichs (Stuttgart, 1969), 890–94.
“Entwurf einer Einleitung zur Geschichte des Preussischer Unterrichtswesens”, 80. For another Statement of Dilthey’s educational views with important political implications, see the memo of 1905 to Friedrich Althoff, Prussian Minister of Education and Religious Affairs. “Wilhelm Dilthey: Gutachten” Neue Sammlung, 10 (1970), 110–21 et passim.
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. V: “Ideen über eine beschreibende und Zergliedernde Psychologie”, 212.
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VI: Die Geistige Welt “Über die Möglichkeit einer allgemeingültigen pädagogischen Wissenschaft”, 65, 70.
“Schleiermachers politische Gesinnung”, 5.
Leben Schleiermachers, Vol. I, Erster Halbband, (Berlin, 1970), 467. This edition is also available as Vol. XIII of the Gesammelte Schriften.
Leben Schleiermachers, Vol. I, Erster Halbband, (Berlin, 1970), 468, 475. Franz has pointed to the sources of Protestant Pietism in Schleiermacher’s conception of Bildung or personal cultivation. The terms Bilden, Ausbilden, denoting — like Bildung — the cultivation that forms personality, also stood for an inward transformation through the imitation of Christ. Personality was inwardly transformed by embracing an image of ideal perfection. Franz, 391–92.
Der Junge Dilthey, 117.
“Ideen”, 217, 225. “Grundlinien eines Systems der Pädagogik”, 197–99. Dilthey’s view of personality was more than a theory for him; it was both theory and practice. In his diaries, the young Dilthey had recorded his reflections as he struggled with the question of personal vocation. We began life in half-darkness about ourselves. Self discovery meant getting in touch with “the depth of one’s individuality” gauging that for which “one has been created”, one’s inner vocation. Only by wedding choice to lucid and intimate self-knowledge, would human action be animated by the full force of personal passion and powerful volitions. Following this path, men liberated themselves from “external fate” and the “chase after happiness”; they were no longer “playballs”, thrown about in life. Dilthey’s own preoccupation with personal uniqueness found expression in an intense and powerful sense of vocation: “the most inward mark of existence is the ideal feeling of my task”. Der Junge Dilthey, 52, 44, 266, 62, 117.
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. X: System der Ethik (Stuttgart, 1958), 118–19. Dilthey was an opponent of Herbartian pedagogical theory, which highlighted the many-sided interests and capacities of the child. See Otto Bollnow, “Dilthey’s Pädagogik”, Neue Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Jugendbilding, Heft 4 (1933), 298. For a similar view, see Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York, 1964), 42. “We disapprove of those men whose unique care is to organize and develop all their faculties… without sacrificing any of them… this state of detachment and indetermination has something anti-social about it”. According to Georg Simmel, thinkers in the eighteenth century posited a “natural man” at war with society, for society had suffocated man’s natural goodness, natural intelligence and capacities. The concept of natural man assumed human nature to be basically homogenous and equal. The nineteenth century view stressed man’s uniqueness and incomparability and accented the inequalities among men. Simmel considered Schleiermacher the foremost philosopher of this new individualism. Schleiermacher’s stress on the uniqueness and incomparability of the individual, crowded out the universality of human needs and human rights and made “the principle of the social division of labour part of the metaphysical ground of reality itself”. Kurt Wolff (ed.), The Sociology of George Simmel, (New York, 1950), 78, 81.
Einleitung, 86–87. “Über das Studium”, 63.
“Ideen”, 236–237. “Grundlinien eines Systems der Pädagogik”, 197–99.
“Grundlinien eines Systems der Pädagogik”, 196.
Ernst Troeltsch, “Die deutsche Ideen von der Freiheit”, Die neue Rundschau XXVII (1916), 65–66.
Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969), 163. For an excellent study of the political ramifications of Germany’s rapid industrialization, see Kenneth Barkin, The Controversy over German Industrialization, 1890-1902. (Chicago, 1970).
Ferdinand Tönnies, “Troeltsch und die Philosophie der Geschichte”, Schmollers Jahrbuch, 49 (1925), 183–91. Quoted in Ringer, 168.
Lewis Coser (ed.), Georg Simmel (New Jersey, 1965). For this interpretation of Simmel, see Coser, 10–18. For an illuminating discussion of some of the differences in the thought of Simmel and Dilthey, see Uta Gerhardt “Immanenz und Widerspruch: Die Philosophischen Grundlagen der Soziologie Georg Simmel und ihr Verhaltnis zur Lebensphilosophie Wilhelm Diltheys”. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 25 (1971), 276–92.
Donald Levine (ed.), Georg Simmel: On Individuality and Social Forms. “Group Expansion and the Development of Individuality”, (Chicago, 1971), 270.
Donald Levine (ed.), Georg Simmel: On Individuality and Social Forms, “The Metropolis and Mental Life”, 1971), 337.
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Kornberg, J. (1991). Dilthey’s Introduction to the Human Sciences: Liberal Social Thought in the Second Reich. In: Bienvenu, R.T., Feingold, M. (eds) In the Presence of the Past. Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Idées / International Archives of the History of Ideas, vol 118. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3764-5_12
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