Abstract
What is truth? What character is it that we can ascribe to an opinion or a statement when we call it true? This is the first question we have to ask, and before trying to answer it, it may be as well to reflect for a moment on what it means. Above all we must distinguish clearly our question, what is truth, from the quite different question, what is true? If we asked what was true, the sort of answer we should hope for would either be as complete an enumeration as possible of all true opinions [the truth about everything], i.e., an encyclopaedia, or else a test or criterion of truth, a method by which we could know a truth from a falsehood. But what we are asking for is neither of these things, but something much more modest; we do not hope to learn an infallible means of telling true statements from false ones, but simply to know what it is that this word “true” means. It is a word which we all understand, but if we try to explain it, we can easily get involved, as the history of philosophy shows, in a maze of confusion.
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Notes
See infra, Ch. <III “Judgment ”>.
<Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford, 1912), p. 205.>
[Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. II, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1911), pp. 282 ff. He even confuses a true statement with one made in good faith.] Footnote to go in here on next page. <It is given in Chapter I as note 5 thereof.>
E.g., the late Dr McTaggart (The Nature of Existence, Vol. I (Cambridge, 1921), p. 11, sect. 10), who held that a true belief was one which corresponded to a fact, and a belief that p was one which either corresponded (if true) or merely “professed to correspond” (if false) to a certain fact. On this view believing truly that p is evidently a simpler notion than believing that p; [but in the absence of any account of the meaning of “professing” it is not one which need be taken very seriously] and much the same would follow from some of Mr Russell’s language in the The Analysis of Mind (London, 1921), pp. 272–273.
Wanted: Note on Peirce. <Ramsey’s principal access to Peirce was via Morris R. Cohen (ed.), C.S. Peirce: Chance, Love, and Logic(New York, 1923).>
William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (New York and London, 1907), p. 222.
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© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Ramsey, F.P., Rescher, N., Majer, U. (1991). The Nature of Truth. In: Rescher, N., Majer, U. (eds) On Truth. Episteme, vol 16. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3738-6_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3738-6_8
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