Abstract
In this paper we argue that the insistence by Fodor et. al. that the Language of Thought hypothesis must be true rests on mistakes about the kinds of explanations that must be provided of cognitive phenomena. After examining the canonical arguments for the LOT, we identify a weak version of the LOT hypothesis which we think accounts for some of the intuitions that there must be a LOT.
We then consider what kinds of explanation cognitive phenomena require, and conclude that three main confusions lead to the invalid inference of the truth of a stronger LOT hypothesis from the weak and trivial version. These confusions concern the relationship between syntax and semantics, the nature of higher-level causation in cognitive science, and differing roles of explanations invoking intrinsic structures of minds on the one hand, and aetiological or evolutionary accounts of their properties on the other.
We are indebted to Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, Huw Price, and Kim Sterelny for their generous and useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to discussions with Martin Davies on these and related issues.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Braddon-Mitchell, D.: 1988, Explanation: A Causally Constrained Pragmatic Account, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Australian National University.
Burian, R.: 1986, ‘On Conceptual Change in Biology’, in Evolution at the Crossroads, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Chomsky, N.: 1965, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Chomsky, N.: 1980, Rules and Representations, Blackwell, Oxford.
Cummins, R.: 1984, The Nature of Psychological Explanation, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Dennett, D.: 1978, ‘Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind’, American Philosophical Quarterly 15, 249–62.
Dennett, D.: 1984, ‘Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem in AI’, in C. Hookaway (ed.), Minds, Machines and Evolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Devitt, M. and K. Sterelny: 1987, Language and Reality, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Eldredge, N. and S. J. Gould: 1972, ‘Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism’, in T. Schopf (ed.), Models in Paleobiology, Freeman Cooper, San Francisco.
Fodor, J.: 1976, The Language of Thought, Harvester Press, Sussex.
Fodor, J.: 1985, ‘Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Aunty’s Vade Mecum’, Mind 94, 76–99.
Fodor, J.: 1987a, Psychosemantics, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Fodor, J.: 1987b, ‘Why There Still Has to Be a Language of Thought’, in J. Fodor, Psychosemantics, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 135–54.
Fodor, J. and Z. Pylyshyn: 1988, ‘Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis’, Cognition 28, 3–71.
Gould, S. J.: 1980, ‘Is a New and General Theory of Evolution Emerging?’, Paleobiology 6, 119–30.
Hookaway, C. (ed.): 1984, Minds, Machines and Evolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Jackson, F. and P. Pettit: 1988, ‘Functionalism and Broad Content’, Mind 97, pp. 381–400.
Kitcher, P.: 1978, ‘Theories, Theorists and Conceptual Change’, The Philosophical Review LXXXVII No. 4, pp. 519–47.
Menzies, P.: 1988, ‘Against Causal Reductionism’, Mind 97, 551–74.
Pelletier, J.: 1982, ‘Completely Non-Clausal, Completely Heuristically Driven Automatic Theorem Proving’, Technical Report 82–7, Department of Computing Science, University of Alberta.
Pollock, J.: (forthcoming), ‘Interest Driven Reasoning’, read to the Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University on May 31, 1988.
Ramsey, W., S. Stich and J. Garon: ‘Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology’, forthcoming in W. Ramsey, D. Rumelhart and S. Stich (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, Erlbaum, New Jersey.
Schopf, T. (ed.): 1972, Models in Paleobiology, Freeman Cooper, San Francisco.
Smolensky, P.: 1988, ‘On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism’, forthcoming in The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 [references in the text are to a preprint from the University of Colorado, 1986].
Stalnaker, R.: 1984, Inquiry, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Stich, S.: 1983, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Braddon-Mitchell, D., Fitzpatrick, J. (1991). Explanation and the Language of Thought. In: Fetzer, J.H. (eds) Epistemology and Cognition. Studies in Cognitive Systems, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3716-4_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3716-4_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5652-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-3716-4
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive