Abstract
Merleau-Ponty underlines the problem of the mediation between the world of nature and the world of persons in Husserl’s phenomenology and points out that there is “a difficulty of principle in unraveling the connection between Nature and persons.”1 In order to shed light on the problem, this paper attempts to see in unity two divergent perspectives. On the one hand, the retrospective inquiry of genetic phenomenology leads us back from the developed correlation between the world and world-consciousness to a pre-ego level within which it attempts to clarify Husserl’s inklings of a “primal initial horizon” and a “first hyle.”2 On the other hand, the prospective inquiry of Hegel’s dialectic of the subjective spirit (and neo-Hegelian theories of feeling) begins at the stage of the “soul” with an undifferentiated sentience of the affections of the living body and advances to the phase in which subjectivity comes to distinguish itself from an external object. Having established this Husserlian and Hegelian background, we will then take into consideration Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the mutual belongingness of man and nature. The task at hand is an attempt at working out this relationship as a means to afford a clarification of the issues raised by the notion of a primal horizon.
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signes (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), p. 225. (Hereafter: S)
Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Dritter Teil, Husser-liana, Vol. XV, Iso Kern, ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 604.
Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Dritter Teil, Husser-liana, Vol. XV, Iso Kern, ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 385.
See Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Dritter Teil, Husser-liana, Vol. XV, Iso Kern, ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 583
Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Dritter Teil, Husser-liana, Vol. XV, Iso Kern, ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 595
Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Dritter Teil, Husser-liana, Vol. XV, Iso Kern, ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp.
Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Dritter Teil, Husser-liana, Vol. XV, Iso Kern, ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p.605.
Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch, Husserliana, Vol. IV, Marly Biemel, ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), p. 338.
Husserliana, XV, p. 604.
Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Zweiter Teil, Husserliana, Vol. XIV, Iso Kern, ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 333.
Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Zweiter Teil, Husserliana, Vol. XIV, Iso Kern, ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 334.
Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Zweiter Teil, Husserliana, Vol. XIV, Iso Kern, ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 334.
See Robert Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution, Phaenomenologica 18 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 218–219.
See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Husserl et la notion de Nature,” Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 70, 1965, 3, p. 268
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Résumés de cours (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), p. 149. (Hereafter: RC)
Husserliana, IV, pp. 275–76.
Husserliana, p. 338. See pp. 280–81, 338–39.
Husserliana, XV, p. 385.
Ludwig Landgrebe, “The Problem of Passive Constitution,” Analecta Husserliana, Vol. VII, 1978, p. 33.
See Ludwig Landgrebe, “The Problem of Passive Constitution,” Analecta Husserliana, Vol. VII, 1978, pp. 23–36.
Ludwig Landgrebe, “Phänomenologische Analyse und Dialektik,” Phänomenologische Forschungen, 10, 1980, p. 75.
G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, §403. Passages quoted will be taken from the English translation by M. J. Pety, Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), Vol. II, p. 219. (Hereafter: Enz.)
Enz., §402Z (Vol. II, p. 211). In this presentation of the transition from soul to consciousness I have drawn heavily from this important addition to §402 in which Hegel concisely elucidates the feeling soul as an intermediate stage between natural life and objective consciousness.
Enz., §391Z (Vol. II, p.27).
Enz., §412 (Vol. II, p. 425).
Enz., §400 (Vol. II, p. 153).
Enz., §415 (Vol. III, p. 11).
F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), p. 508.
Errol E. Harris, The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965), p. 313.
G. W. F. Hegel, Jenenser Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie, G. Lasson, ed. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1923), p. 193.
See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La structure du comportment (Paris: PUF, 1924), p. 175. (Hereafter: SC)
SC, p. 224.
SC, p. 222.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), p. 147. (Hereafter: PP)
PP, p. 277.
PP, p. 340.
PP, p.467.
PP, p. 370.
PP, p. 279.
RC, pp. 110–111.
RC, p. 94. See S, pp. 225–27; RC, p. 149.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le visible et l’invisible (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 328. (Heareafter: VI) See also RC, p. 152. On the attachment of experience to the world of nature and the ontological primacy of nature, see Théodore F. Geraets, “Merleau-Ponty’s Conception of Nature,” Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XVI, pp. 301–312.
VI, pp. 178, 313, 325.
VI, pp. 187, 180.
VI, pp. 174, 183.
VI, pp. 179, 309.
VI, p. 180.
VI, pp. 172, 175, 183.
RC, p. 176.
VI, pp. 303–304.
Enz. §402Z (Vol. II, p. 207).
Enz., §412Z (Vol. II, p. 427).
See L. Landgrebe, “The Problem of Passive Constitution,” Analecta Husserliana, Vol. VII, p. 26.
E. E. Harris, The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science, p. 491.
See also Errol E. Harris, Perceptual Assurance and the Reality of the World (New York: Clark Univ. Press, 1974), pp. 44–48.
Enz., §402Z (Vol. II, p. 211).
Enz., §403 (Vol. II, p. 217).
Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Husserliana, Vol. VI, Walter Biemel, ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), p. 187.
Enz., §402Z (Vol. II, p. 213).
RC, p. 149. See also S, p. 227.
Husserliana, XV, p. 212.
PP, p. 340.
VI, pp. 152, 180.
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Walton, R.J. (1991). Nature and The “Primal Horizon”. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) The Turning Points of the New Phenomenological Era. Analecta Husserliana, vol 34. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3464-4_6
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