Abstract
That the phenomenon of sight or visual perception should be so prominently present in Husserl’s writings is not very surprising. To him phenomena, according to its Greek etymology, was primarily “that which appears to the eyes” of man. From the very first, the act of perception was seen by Husserl as the most original of the acts that refer us to things, so much so that in the Logische Untersuchungen the act of primordial intuition is identified with the act of perception itself.
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References
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© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Gandelman, C. (1991). Philosophy as a Sign-Producing Activity: The Metastable Gestalt of Intentionality. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) The Turning Points of the New Phenomenological Era. Analecta Husserliana, vol 34. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3464-4_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3464-4_21
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