Abstract
“Foundedness” and “Motivation” are two fundamental notions in phenomenology.1 But what is the relationship between them? It seems to be quite difficult to find an answer to this question in the existing literature of phenomenology. For example, no one can deny that these two concepts play important roles in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. But to this question Merleau-Ponty did not provide any answer. He did not even give us any thematic characterizations of both concepts, except for some short notes of clarification. The lack of an explicit clarification of the relationship between “foundedness” and “motivation” often makes one wonder if these two concepts are synonymous or interchangeable. Our task here is to trace back the problem in the phenomenology of Husserl and to provide a clarification of these two concepts, so that a precise relationship between them can be determined.
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Notes
Cf. Logical Investigations, pp. 455–462.
Cf. Elmar Holenstein, Phänomenologie der Assoziation, p. 171.
Traditionally, talk of “motiv” is confined to the field of emotional, in particular, volitional phenomena. Cf. Logical Investigations, p. 273.
Cf. Logische Untersuchungen §28; J. N. Findlay translated Begründung as “strict demonstration.”
In some manuscripts one can also find out his analysis of this new conception, e.g., A VI 25, pp. 7–9: “Motivation, passive und aktive Motivation” (1924); p. 11: “Ob man bei Assoziation von Motivation sprechen Kann” (1924); A VI 19, p. 17: “Verständlichkeit der Motivationserkenntnis“(1916?); A IV 17, p. 30a: “Motivation und Assoziation” (untranscribed) and EIII 2, pp. 53–4: Kausale Erklärung von Phychischen und Motivation (1921) (partially quoted in Holenstein’s book, p. 184); also in Ding und Raum, pp. 358–368, Motivationszummenhang und Apperzeption (1916).
Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers III, p. 37.
Elmar Holenstein, Phänomenologie der Assoziation, p. 185.
Bernhard Rang, Kausalität und Motivation, p. 115.
Cf. Elmar Holenstein, Phänomenologie der Assoziation, p. 188
For a detailed exposition of the roles played by the rational and associative motivations in the problem of constitution, cf. Rang’s Kausalität und Motivation.
For an analysis of the different meanings of “apperception”, cf. Elmar Holenstein, Phänomenologie der Assoziation, pp. 132–166.
Cf. Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 49–58. Whether it is possible to work out a kind of modal logic which is “strong” enough to develop a “logic of motivation”, still remains an open-problem. But the author is skeptical as to this possibility.
Dorion Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, p. 13.
Cf. Ideen II, p. 240.
For the role played by the associative motivation in the Sinngenesis, cf. Holenstein, Elmar Holenstein, Phänomenologie der Assoziation, p 171.
Logical Investigations, p. 571.
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Dedicated to Professor Ludwig Landgrebe for his eighty-ninth birthday.
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© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Wing-Cheuk, C. (1991). Foundedness and Motivation. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) The Turning Points of the New Phenomenological Era. Analecta Husserliana, vol 34. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3464-4_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3464-4_19
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