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Institutional Theory and Institutional Legal Positivism

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Law, Institution and Legal Politics

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 14))

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Abstract

Institutional theories were developed by B. Malinowsky, H. Schelsky and other sociologists. The philosophy of law has produced one interesting and important school of thought in the field of institutional philosophy which is represented preeminently by M. Hauriou, S. Romano, G. Renard and C. Schmitt. On its basis D.N. MacCormick and I independently from each other evolved a legal ontology and a legal-philosophical conception. This will be known under the name ‘Institutional Legal Positivism’ (abbr. ILP).1 Our conception is not based on the sociological theory of the institutions, nor is it in terms of the history of ideas an off-spring of Hauriou’s theory of law. Our reflections were motivated by different questions from those which led to Hauriou’s investigations, in particular the question: “What means social existence of a norm or of law as a system of norms?2; furthermore, there was the problem of different types of facts confronting man.3 In this point both MacCormick and I were influenced by Searle’s and Anscombe’s juxtaposition of ‘brute facts’ and ‘institutional facts’.4

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References

  1. See D.N. MacCormick O. Weinberger, Grundlagen des Institutionalistischen Rechtspositivismus, Berlin 1985

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  2. E.g. expressed in brief by the title of my paper “Die Norm als Gedanke und Realität”, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht, 20, 1970, pp. 203–216

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  3. Compare D.N. MacCormick, institutional Facts, Edinburg 1973; O. Weinberger, Tatsachen und Tatsachenbeschreibungen. Eine logisch-methodologische Überlegung zu einem Grundlagenproblem der Sozialwissenschaften, in: K. Salamun (ed.), Sozialphilosophie als Aufklärung, FS für Ernst Topitsch, Tübingen 1979, pp. 173–187

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  4. G.E.M. Anscombe, On Brute Facts, Analysis 18, 3, 1958, pp. 69–72; J.R. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge 1969

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  5. W. Krawietz, Begründung des Rechts — anthropologisch betrachtet: zur Institutionentheorie von Weinberger und Schelsky, in: W. Krawietz H. Schelsky G. Winkler A. Schramm (eds.), Theorie der Normen. Festgabe für Ota Weinberger, Berlin 1984, pp. 542–556. (I am, of course, very grateful to my friend Werner Krawietz for the publication of this “Festgabe” and for this contribution which was particularly stimulating and instructive for me.)

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  6. The systems proposed by the deontic logic and other attempts of establishing a theory of normative logic indirectly on the basis of the descriptive language fail in their attempt in my view. Compare O. Weinberger, Die Sollsatzproblematik in der modernen Logik, Rozpravy Ceskoslovenské akademie věd, 9 (1968), Rada SV, Praha 1958; reprinted in: O. Weinberger, Studien zur Normenlogik und Rechtsinformatik, Berlin 1974, pp. 59–186; Ch. Weinberger/O. Weinberger, Logik, Semantik, Hermeneutik, München 1979; O. Weinberger, Der Begriff der Nichterfüllung und die Normenlogik, Ratio 14, 1972, pp. 15–32; the same, Kann man das normenlogische Folgerungssystem philosophisch begründen? Überlegungen zu den Grundlagen des juristischen Folgerns, ARSP 65, 1979, pp. 161–186; the same, The Expressive Conception of Norms — an Impasse for the Logic of Norms, Law and Philosophy 4, 1985, pp. 165–198; the same, “Is” and “ought” reconsidered. Comment on G.H. von Wright’s lecture “Is and ought”, ARSP LXX, 1984, pp. 454474

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  7. O. Weinberger, Eine Semantik für die praktische Philosophie, in: R. Haller (ed.), Beiträge zur Philosophie von Stephan Körner, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 29, 1983, pp. 219–239

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  8. For my conception of the theory of action see: O. Weinberger, Studien zur formal-finalistischen Handlungstheorie, Frankfurt a.M./Bcrn/New York 1983, and Chap. II of this volume

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  9. How this can be achieved I have broadly outlined elsewhere (compare ftn. 9). A great many problems remain, however, concerning the details of such a theory. I am fully aware, of course, of the many problems connected with the depiction of causality itself and of the fact that the conceptual explanation of ‘cause’, ‘effect’, ‘causal relation’ is dependent on the application of these terms in the context of action, i.e. as information for the determination of actions. Compare G.H. von Wright, Erklären und Verstehen, Frankfurt a.M. 1974, pp. 67 ff. Taken as a whole, this thought process is not, however, circular, in my view. It merely reflects the intrinsic structural link between the realm of causal cognition on the one hand, and teleology and the theory of action, on the other

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  10. Compare ftn. 4, p. 163

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  11. See Chap. I, Para. 6

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  12. The legal system contains institutions like marriage, property, contract etc. by setting out the conditions for the genesis of an institution of this kind, by determining which relations establishing duties, permissions and authorisations apply in this particular case, and finally, by defining the way the existence of this individual case of such an institution is to be ended. Compare D.N. MacCormick, Law as Institutional Fact, Edinburgh 1973, pp. 5 ff., where the author distinguishes between ‘institutive’, ‘consequential’ and ‘terminative’ rules of a legal institution

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  13. Compare A. Ross, Tû-Tû, Harvard Law Review 70, (1956-7), pp. 812–825

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  14. Compare ftn. 15, also D.N. MacCormick O. Weinberger, Grundlagen des Institutionalistischen Rechtspositivismus, Berlin 1985; English version: An Institutional Theory of Law. New Approaches to legal Positivism, Dordrecht et al. 1986

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  15. Compare F.C. von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, Heidelberg 1814, p. 9

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  16. S. Romano, Die Rechtsordnung, ed. by. R. Schnur, Berlin 1975, p. 32

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  17. S. Romano, ibid., p. 23: “Seen in this comprehensive manner the legal order is an entity which moves in accordance with the norms. Above all, though, the legal order itself also moves the norms similar to figures on a chessboard. Consequently, the norms are objects and tools in the activities of the legal order rather than elements of its inherent structure.”

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  18. M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den sozialen Vitalismus, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution, Berlin 1965, pp. 27–66

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  19. See M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den sozialen Vitalismus, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution, Berlin 1965 ibid., p. 29, p. 44

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  20. M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den sozialen Vitalismus, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution, Berlin 1965 ibid., p. 28

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  21. M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den sozialen Vitalismus, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution, Berlin 1965 ibid., p. 34

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  22. M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den sozialen Vitalismus, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution, Berlin 1965 ibid., p. 33

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  23. M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den sozialen Vitalismus, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution, Berlin 1965 ibid., p. 34, p. 35

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  24. M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den sozialen Vitalismus, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution, Berlin 1965 ibid., p. 65

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  25. M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den sozialen Vitalismus, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution, Berlin 1965 ibid., p. 32

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  26. “Admittedly, it is Claude Bernard’s famous ‘idée directrice’ that is interpreted here in the vitalist sense, and, I am certain, that this will be noticed also by the biologists. On the other hand it is especially among them that vitalism has its supporters, and in the end there is always this basic fact: when it is projected onto the social level the governing idea appears as objective in the acutally palpable phenomenon of this association; it is the governing idea that influences its members and its mysterious effect that stirs the masses into action.” M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den sozialen Vitalismus, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution, Berlin 1965 ibid., p. 47

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  27. M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den sozialen Vitalismus, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution, Berlin 1965 ibid., p. 39

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  28. M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den sozialen Vitalismus, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution, Berlin 1965 ibid., pp. 35 f.: “As we know, every associative institution contains three elements: 1. the idea of a project to be achieved in a social group; 2. the organised power in the service of this idea for the purpose of realizing the idea; 3. the expressions of communality occurring within the social group with reference to the idea and its realization.”

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  29. M. Hauriou, Die Theorie der Institution und der Gründung. Essay über den sozialen Vitalismus, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution, Berlin 1965 ibid., pp. 42 ff

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  30. See J. Delos, La Théorie de l’Institution, Archives de Philosophie du droit et de Sociologie juridique 1931, pp. 119 ff

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  31. G. Renard, La Théorie de l’Institution. Essai d’ontologie juridique, Paris 1930, p. XIII

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  32. M Hauriou, Sozialordnung, Gerechtigkeit und Recht, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution, ibid., pp. 67–95; p. 91

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  33. M. Hauriou, Sozialordnung, Gerechtigkeit und Recht, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Theorie der Institution Berlin 1965 ibid., p. 95

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  34. “L’institution s’impose par la force des choses; elle fait partis de ces notions de droit naturel qui rentent par la fenêtre lorsqu’on les chasse par la porte.” M. Renard, ibid., p. 281

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  35. M. Renard, ibid., p. 391

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  36. M. Renard, ibid., p. 360: “La loi naturelle laisse au discernement de l’homme le soin d’en choisir et de varier les formes, indéfinement; son engagement n’est pas étroitement borné à l’exécution d’un programme tracé point par point.”

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  37. M. Renard, ibid., pp. 389 f.: “le droit naturel sanctionne les inclinations humaines, en tant qu’elles sont gouvernées par la raison; or il existe dans la nature humaine une inclination à ce dépassement de soi que traduit le formule de la fondation et de l’institution; donc la fondation instituteile est sanctionnée par le droit naturel moyennenant satisfaction donnée aux exigences de la raison.”

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  38. M. Renard, ibid., p. 390

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  39. M. Renard, ibid., p. 13

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  40. M. Renard, ibid., p. 47: “L’ordre juridique repose sur un double support: la personnalité humaine et l’institution.”

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  41. M. Renard, ibid., p. 109

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  42. M. Renard, ibid., pp. 120 f

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  43. M. Renard, ibid., pp. 330 ff

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  44. M. Renard, ibid., p. 426

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  45. M. Renard, ibid., p. 49: “le droit n’est pas seulement facteur de justice et par consequent de moralité; il est facteur de sécurité; et c’est l’union de le justice et de la sécurité qui en fait une discipline originale.”

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  46. M. Renard, ibid., p. 94

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  47. Compare the concept of pure jurisprudence and those of other analytical theories of the law. Romano quotes the relevant works by F. Weyr (Zum Problem eines einheitlichen Rechtssystems, Archiv für öffentliches Recht XXIII/1908) in addition to Kelsen’s

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  48. See S. Romano, Die Rechtsordnung, ed. by R. Schnur, Berlin 1975, pp. 27 f., 26, 75

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  49. S. Romano, ibid., p. 32

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  50. S. Romano, ibid., p. 37

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  51. S. Romano, ibid., p. 27

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  52. S. Romano, ibid., pp. 38 ff

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  53. S. Romano, ibid., p. 40. In this there appears to be an echo of Renards concept of the institutional hierarchy

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  54. S. Romano, ibid., p. 41

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  55. S. Romano, ibid., p. 49

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  56. S. Romano, ibid., p. 50

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  57. S. Romano, ibid., p. 69

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  58. S. Romano, ibid., pp. 112 ff

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  59. M. Fuchs, Die allgemeine Rechtstheorie Santi Romanos, Berlin 1979, p. 67

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  60. C. Schmitt, Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens, Hamburg 1934, pp. 13 f

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  61. C. Schmitt, ibid., p. 15

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  62. C. Schmitt, ibid., p. 25

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  63. C. Schmitt, ibid., p. 35

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  64. See C. Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung, Tübingen 1931; also W. Mantl, Hans Kelsen und Carl Schmitt, in: W. Krawietz/E. Topitsch/P. Koller (eds.), Ideologiekritik und Demo-kratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 4, 1982, pp. 185–199

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  65. C. Schmitt, ibid., p. 24. Schmitt refers to p. 17 of Romano’s work “L’ordinamento giuridico”

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  66. The reader will find a more detailed account of the sociological theories of the institution, for instance, in H. Schelsky, Zur soziologischen Theorie der Institution, in: H. Schelsky (ed.), Zur soziologischen Theorie der Institution, Düsseldorf 1973, pp. 7–26; also in H. Schelsky, Die Soziologen und das Recht, Opladen 1980

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  67. A. Gehlen, Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt, Bonn 1955, p. 84

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  68. See for the following: A. Gehlen, Probleme einer soziologischen Handlungstheorie, in: A. Gehlen, Studien zur Anthropologie und Soziologie, Neuwied — Berlin 1971, pp. 196–231

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  69. In the formal-finalist theory of action I have defined the term ‘motive’ as ‘interpreted purpose’, while taking into account other fixed determinants of action apart from motives. See O. Weinberger, Studien zur formal-finalistischen Handlungstheorie, Frankfurt a.M./Bern/New York 1983. Basically this is a matter of terminology rather than a factual divergence of opinion

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  70. See especially H. Schelsky, Die Soziologie und das Recht, loc.cit., pp. 77–146

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  71. H. Schelsky, ibid., pp. 77 f

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  72. H. Schelsky, ibid., pp. 82 f. While Gehlen may not have discussed the individual’s influence on the institution in greater detail, compared with other sociologists there are, in my view hardly any of those tendencies to see the individual as being submerged in the institution present in his work

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  73. H. Schelsky, ibid., p. 95

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  74. H. Schelsky, Soziologie — wie ich sie verstehe, in: H. Schelsky (ed.), Die Soziologen und das Recht, op. cit., pp. 26 f

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  75. H. Schelsky, Die Soziologen und das Recht, p. 93

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  76. N. Luhmann, Institutionalisierung — Funktion und Mechanismus im sozialen System der Gesellschaft, in: H. Schelsky, Zur Theorie der Institutionen, Düsseldorf 1973, p. 23: “We shall assume in the following that it is not the concept of the institution but the concept of the social system which defines the realm of sociology”; see also pp. 36 f

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  77. N. Luhmann, Grundrechte als Institution, Berlin 1965, pp. 12 f

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  78. N. Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, 2 vols., Hamburg 1972

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  79. N. Luhmann, Institutionalisierung — Funktion und Mechanismus im sozialen System der Gesellschaft, in: H. Schelsky (ed.), Zur Theorie der Institution, p. 30

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  80. N. Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, vol. 1. p. 43

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  81. Conceptions tending in the direction of the institutional ontology of norms really don’t occur before Hart. See H. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford 1961

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  82. With reference to this point the comparison with language (e.g. some kind of colloquial language) is instructive. There is no need at all for the rules of language to be formulated explicitely; nevertheless, they exist and are conditiones sine qua non of the language and for the possibility of using it in the reality of the social context. See also Wittgenstein’s analogous statements in respect of language rules in: L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, Oxford 1953

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  83. See Schmitt’s political theory which is based on the concept of the friend-enemy distinction as the central content of politics, in: C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (19322), Berlin 1963. The fact that politics are also meant to create cooperative structures, a balance of interests and constellations for peace as forms of life in a society does not seem important to Schmitt. In my view politics concern both: friend-enemy structures and strategies as well as cooperative efforts and the creation of structures to ensure peace. I personally rate the peace-construction more highly and assess friend-enemy considerations from the point of view of peaceful and cooperative objectives

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  84. See O. Weinberger, Studien zur formal-finalistischen Handlungstheorie, Frankfurt a.M./ Bern/New York 1983; also, Eine Semantik für die praktische Philosophie, Grazer philosophische Studien 20/1983, pp. 219–239; also, Freedom, Range of Action and the Ontology of Norms, Synthese 65 (1985), pp. 307–324

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  85. Compare my comments in the works mentioned in ftn. 91 and: Tatsachen und Tatsachenbeschreibungen. Eine logisch-methodologische Überlegung zu einem Grundlagenproblem der Sozialwissenschaft, in: K. Salamun (ed.), Sozialphilosophie als Aufklärung, FS für Ernst Topitsch, Tübingen 1979, pp. 173–187

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    Ota Weinberger

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Weinberger, O. (1991). Institutional Theory and Institutional Legal Positivism. In: Law, Institution and Legal Politics. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3458-3_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3458-3_7

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