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Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 128))

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Abstract

What the scientist is seeking beyond law is, of course, often designated by the term cause, which in this sense becomes almost synonymous with the term explanation: when one knows the cause or causes of a phenomenon, the phenomenon will be explained and the mind will declare itself satisfied.

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Notes

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  21. Sophie Germain, Considérations générales sur l’état des sciences et des lettres aux différentes époques de leur culture, Oeuvres philosophiques (Paris: Paul Ritti, 1878), pp. 158–159. The text reads “ni être, n’être pas différent [neither be, not be different],” which is nonsense and an obvious printer’s error (the edition is full of them). Moreover, the original edition (Paris: Lachevardière, 1833) gives the correct reading instead [“ni n’être pas ni être différent (neither not be nor be different)”] (p. 57). [Nor is the 1927 edition of De l’Explication dans les sciences free of errors. We have corrected as many as possible, usually silently. In this case, what the 1879 (not 1878, as printed here, though correctly identified as 1879 elsewhere) edition actually says is “ni être ni n’être pas différent (neither be nor not be different)”]. Sophie Germain seems to have borrowed this notion in part from Laplace; see Appendix 3.

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  22. Edmond Goblot, Traité de logique (Paris: Armand Colin, 1918), pp. 291, 295–296.

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  23. Edmond Goblot, Essai sur la classification des sciences (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1898), p. 47: “Causality ... is a transitory notion, which rational science endeavors to eliminate and whose role is so unimportant in the theoretical explanation of phenomena that scientists have not even felt the need to clarify its equivocal and obscure meaning.”

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© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Meyerson, É. (1991). Deduction. In: Explanation in the Sciences. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 128. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3414-9_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3414-9_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5511-6

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