Abstract
Critical philosophy of history comprises a field of study much concerned with the problem of time and mind. The intimate relation between philosophy and history has given rise to a series of issues concerning the “territory of time.” The theme, the time and mind, has been treated from a variety of perspectives. Historically, it first received treatment from philosophers as part of the problem of the determination of the forms of thought, conceived in a way which continues to be regarded as the distinctively philosophical attitude to the question. Meanwhile, philosophies of history which interpret the historical process have reflected the centuries-old debate centering around the crucial issue: how do we know the past? At the turn of the twentieth century challenges to Newtonian physics, particularly to the notion of time as being “absolute,” contributed to the lively controversies concerning the nature of historical time and the epistemological status of historical knowledge. The controversy emerged in the 1880’s and became an active issue during the early decades of the twentieth century. Central to the issue has been the view that the point at which philosophy and history meet provides a comprehensive scheme within which historical data may be systematically analyzed and comprehended: the individual mind.
Time presupposes a view of time.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
History is the intellectual form in which a civilization renders account of its past.
Johan Huizinga
Time is a discovery which is only made by thinking. We create it as an idea and do not begin until much later to suspect that we ourselves are Time, inasmuch as we live.
Oswald Spengler
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 411; Johan Huizinga, “A Definition of the Concept of History,” in Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer, ed. Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 9; Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, ed. Helmut Wagner, trans. Charles F. Atkinson (New York: The Modern Library, 1962), p. 77.
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Notes
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2 vols., introd. by A. D. Lindsay (London: Everyman’s Library, 1911), I: 73–96; Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 20, and Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1950), pp. 122–23.
Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness,trans. F. L. Pogson (New York: Harper Paperback, 1960), pp. 119–121.
R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 213.
Arthur Schopenhaur, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1966) II. 403–410, 439–442.
Edward Hallett Carr, What is History? (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 9, 24.
R. G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 205.
R. G. Collingwood, “The Philosophy of History” in The Historical Association Leaflet, num. 79 (1930): 14
R. G. Collingwood, “The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 25 (1925): 163–73.
R. G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 7.
Ibid., pp. 30–31, 60; R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958), p. 222.
R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1948).
R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, intro. by Stephen Toulmin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 110; R. G. Collingwood, Religion and Philosophy (London: Macmillan and Co., 1916), pp. 49–51; Ortega, Obras, op. cit., 7: 148–50, 152–53, 415–16. In emphasizing the subjective dimensions of our experience of time, Collingwood maintains that the “past as past” and the “future as future” are not existent qua real in the present but are “purely ideal.” That is, ”the past as living in the present and the future as germinating in the present are wholly real and indeed are just the present itself. . . . That which is ideal is for a mind, and has no other being except to be an object of mind. . .. Hence, if there were no mind, there would at any given moment be no past and no future; there would only be a present in which the past survived transformed and in which the future was present in germ. The past as past and the future as future, in contradistinction from their fusion in the present, have being for m
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© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Holmes, O.W. (1991). Historical Time, Mind and Critical Philosophy of History. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) New Queries in Aesthetics and Metaphysics. Analecta Husserliana, vol 37. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3394-4_3
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