Abstract
Liability laws are a very attractive policy instrument in a market economy for a number of reasons. If an individual agent inflicts a damage on another party, liability rules allow the damage costs to be attributed to the agent who caused the damage. The originator of a damage will be forced to pay, and he will not be able to transplant some of the social costs of his action on someone else. Liability will tend to bring private and social costs into line. In principle, therefore, liability is an efficient social institution for dealing with other and third-party damages.
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Siebert, H. (1991). Liability Issues in Pollution Control. In: Opschoor, J.B., Pearce, D.W. (eds) Persistent Pollutants. Economy & Environment, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3372-2_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3372-2_20
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