Vagueness and the Desiderata for Definition

  • Roy Sorensen
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 216)


The purpose of this paper is to show how vagueness is relevant to definition and thereby to thought experiments, the methodology of analysis, and substantive philosophical positions. I hope to achieve this goal en passant in the course of arguing for the main thesis: definitions must preserve borderline cases to the same extent as clear cases.


Thought Experiment Borderline Case Hard Case Clear Case Ordinary Usage 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roy Sorensen
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNew York UniversityUSA

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