Abstract
I shall restrict my treatment of Bacon’s philosophy only to its drive towards an informative science, and I shall argue that this was its essential thesis. It entailed his view of observation and of its role in the procedure of discovery, and finally it entailed the logic of this procedure with its inevitable paradoxes and irrationality.
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© 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bechler, Z. (1991). Bacon’s Informative Logic. In: Newton’s Physics and the Conceptual Structure of the Scientific Revolution. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 127. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3276-3_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3276-3_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-1054-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-3276-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive