Abstract
For Bobbio, it is beyond doubt that analogical inference must have a logical foundation, and only a logical one; reasoning by analogy would accordingly be logical reasoning where “formal logic will be more important than the teleological approach”1. Bobbio’s study is, then, presented in two separate parts: one dealing with the logical aspect of analogy (formal logic), the other with analogical inference in legal science2.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
N. Bobbio, L’analogia nella logica del diritto, Turin, 1938.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1991 Springer Sceience+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Nerhot, P. (1991). Legal Knowledge and Meaning (The Example of Legal Analogy). In: Nerhot, P. (eds) Legal Knowledge and Analogy. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3260-2_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3260-2_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5438-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-3260-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive