Abstract
In logic texts, it is generally assumed that verbs denote properties of, or relations among, individuals. This is in marked contrast to the common view that verbs stand for events, actions, or states. In this paper I explore the common view about verbs. This quickly turns into a revised view, according to which it is whole ‘atomic’ sentences (of English) that do the denoting, not just the verbs themselves. This is then most naturally formalized as if sentences of English were singular terms within a version of free logic, with the true ones successfully denoting events, and the false ones failing to denote.
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Notes
I assume that ‘name-filling’ is like quantification in that it can occur at any of various stages; this accounts for the fact that names, as well as quantifiers, have’ scope’. In a logic such as Quine’s version of Russell’s, names of natural language are represented by quantifiers; in a free logic they are not; in either case they need to have scope. The treatment of names is well-studied and debated; I do not pursue it here.
Plato says: “… we have two kinds of vocal indications of being. … One called nouns, the other verbs. … The indication which relates to action we may call a verb. … And the vocal sign applied to those who perform the actions in question we call a noun.” He goes on to refer to “… ‘walks’, ‘runs’,’ sleeps’ and the other verbs which denote actions.” Plato, Sophist 261D-262C.
Suppose that Brutus imagines Caesar as a tyrant, and also simultaneously imagines him as a griffin. Then the sentence ‘Brutus imagined Caesar’ may give trouble. For the description ‘e is an imagining & Agent (e, Brutus) & Object (e, Caesar) & ehappens at fwill apparently not be individuating’.
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© 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Parsons, T. (1991). Atomic Sentences as Singular Terms in Free Logic. In: Spohn, W., Van Fraassen, B.C., Skyrms, B. (eds) Existence and Explanation. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 49. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3244-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3244-2_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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