The Sense-Reference Distinction

Abstract

It is generally accepted that Indian philosophers of language do not posit sense as a component of the meaning of an expression in addition to its reference. There is, for instance, no notion of analyticity-- of propositions which are true by virtue of meaning alone--in Indian philosophy. Likewise no distinction is drawn between contingently and necessarily non-existent objects: two stock examples of a non-existent are the horns of a hare and the son of a barren woman, and these two examples are treated as in all respects alike. Thus the distinction is not drawn between negative existentials that are true by virtue of the meanings of their constituent words, and negative existentials that are made true by the facts. We find instead a more or less pure reference theory of meaning: the meaning of an expression is that entity which the expression designates. Here the name-bearer relation seems to reign supreme as the central metaphor of semantics. I shall nonetheless argue that, predominant though the reference theory might be in their tradition, certain Indian philosophers of language were still forced to recognize something akin to sense as a distinct element in meaning. That the sense- reference distinction was never extensively made use of by Indian philosophers of language is clear; I shall not be concerned to dispute this or attempt to explain it. Instead I wish to explore how recognition of something sense-like is forced on philosophers working in a tradition dominated by an extreme realist view of all semantic properties.¹.