Skip to main content

Feyerabend on Falsifications, Galileo, and Lady Reason

  • Chapter

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 132))

Abstract

Feyerabend maintains that in our world a falsificationist methodology meets insurmountable obstacles. Every hypothesis in science encounters empirical deviations big enough to falsify it. Therefore a falsificationist methodology would destroy science without giving us any substitute.1

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. Paul K. Feyerabend, Der wissenschaftstheoretische Realismus und die Autorität der Wissenchaften (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1978), 227.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  2. Ibid., 310.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  3. Paul K. Feyerabend, “More clothes from the emperor’s bargain basement: A review of Laudan’s Progress and its Problems”, reprinted as chapter 11 in: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Problems of Empiricism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 246.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Nicholas Copernicus, Commentariolus, in Three Copernican Treatises, ed. Edward Rosen, 3d ed., rev. (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), 57.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Paul K. Feyerabend, Against Method (London: NLB, 1975), Appendix, 109–11.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Ibid., 102.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Ibid., 142.

    Google Scholar 

  8. E. J. Dijksterhuis, Die Mechanisierung des Weltbildes (Berlin: Springer, 1956), 425–26.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  9. Feyerabend, Against Method, 155.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Hans Albert, Traktat über kritische Vernunft, 3d ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1973), §5.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Feyerabend, Against Method, 155.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Dijksterhuis, Mechanisierung des Weltbildes, 425–26.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Alexander Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1957), 91. There Koyré also discusses other similar contradictions.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 223.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Ibid., 202–3.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Paul K. Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason (London: Verso, 1987), 287.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 511.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Cf. Gunnar Andersson, Kritik und Wissenschaftsgeschichte: Kuhns, Lakatos’ und Feyerabends Kritik des Kritischen Rationalismus (Tübingen: Mohr, 1988), ch. 6.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Dijksterhuis, Mechanisierung des Weltbildes, 72.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Feyerabend, Against Method, 98.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Ibid., 93.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Ibid., 179.

    Google Scholar 

  23. Dijksterhuis, Mechanisierung des Weltbildes, 71

    Google Scholar 

  24. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, 120.

    Google Scholar 

  25. Dudley Shapere, Galileo: A Philosophical Study (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), ch. 3–4.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, 115–17.

    Google Scholar 

  27. Cf. Dijksterhuis, Mechanisierung des Weltbildes, 198–208 and 243–47.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Ibid., 334–35.

    Google Scholar 

  29. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959), §19.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Ibid., §20.

    Google Scholar 

  31. Cf. Andersson, Kritik und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 134–44.

    Google Scholar 

  32. Copi, Introduction to Logic, 452–53.

    Google Scholar 

  33. Andersson, Kritik und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 140.

    Google Scholar 

  34. Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 2d ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), 241.

    Google Scholar 

  35. Ibid., 143–44.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Feyerabend, Against Method, 112.

    Google Scholar 

  37. Andersson, Kritik und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 190–91.

    Google Scholar 

  38. Cf. Paul K. Feyerabend, “Consolations for the specialist”, in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 229, on epistemological anarchism as an attractive courtesan. The philosophical basis of this mistress is a pragmatic theory of truth according to which that is true which satisfies in the widest sense of the word. Cf. “a plea for hedonism”, ibid., 209–10. As Sancta Claus this courtesan is the product of wishful thinking. Cf. Bertrand Russell, History Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, 2d ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961,), 772: “I have always found that the hypothesis of Sancta Claus ‘works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word’”.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Andersson, G. (1991). Feyerabend on Falsifications, Galileo, and Lady Reason. In: Munévar, G. (eds) Beyond Reason. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 132. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3188-9_12

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3188-9_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5406-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-3188-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics