Abstract
By the late 60s, every good materialist expected that epistemological theory would one day make explanatory contact, perhaps even a reductive contact, with a proper theory of brain function. Not even the most optimistic of us, however, expected this to happen in less than fifty years, and most would have guessed a great deal longer. And yet the time has arrived. Experimental neuroscience has revealed enough of the brain’s microphysical organization, and mathematical analysis and computer simulation have revealed enough of its functional significance, that we can now address epistemological issues directly. Indeed, we are in a position to reconstruct, in neurocomputational terms, issues in the philosophy of science specifically. This is my aim in what follows.
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Churchland, P.M. (1991). A Deeper Unity: Some Feyerabendian Themes in Neurocomputational Form. In: Munévar, G. (eds) Beyond Reason. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 132. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3188-9_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3188-9_1
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