The Resolving Power of a Scientific Theory as a Basis of its Epistemic Appraisal

Abstract

What does then, one might now ask, empirical science aim at? An adequate answer to this question will depend on how we view a scientific theory, in its nature and function, in particular in its relations of interaction with scientific problems themselves. The contemporary debates about the nature of quantum mechanics as a physical theory, that originate from Albert Einstein’s penetrating criticisms of it,¹ are, I believe, quite significant and instructive in this context. I shall refrain from going here into the philosophically interesting aspects of this unended debate about quantum mechanics, as I intend to do so elsewhere. It should suffice here to point out that one of the assumptions on which Einstein’s criticism is based relates to his idea of a complete physical theory.² The questions about quantum mechanics that Einstein asked himself and tried to answer quite naturally raise then questions of a similar nature about scientific theory in general, such as the following: When is a scientific theory a complete theory? Or, what makes a theory a complete scientific theory? I think that one could deal with the subject-specific question of the completeness of a physical theory such as quantum mechanics in a philosophically much better way if one first dealt with the more general question of the completeness of a scientific theory.

The one principle — of designing experiments — is to design them so that they give an answer.

David Keilin [As quoted in C. H. Waddington (1977)].

In my judgement, theory has a double role to play in astronomy; the common one of providing interpretations for observed phenomena; and the uncommon one of providing for astronomy the kind of basis which experiments provide for physics. The latter role is largely unrecognized and largely not practised.

S. Chandrasekhar (1974)