On the Impossibility of any Enterprise Concerning Self-Knowledge Within Traditional Epistemology

Abstract

As an abstract concept, the concept of a knowing subject is as old as epistemology and might be regarded as a lasting contribution of this philosophical enterprise. There is not a single theory of knowledge — whether in the East or in the West — which is not woven around it, or which does not employ it as a central concept. Thus, throughout the different epochs of philosophical thinking concerning the nature of human knowledge in different fields of learning, all attempts at its definition/ characterization invariably fall back upon this concept. This is as much true of Plato as it is of Rene Descartes, the two great system-builders in traditional epistemology (TE). Yet, while all this is true, the concept of a knowing subject remains the least analyzed concept in TE. Is it due to this concept’s fundamental role in TE? Or is there some other reason for the indifference to its analysis?