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Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLB,volume 13))

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Abstract

I define group utility for cases in which a professional decides for a group using his probability assignment for states and the group’s utility assignment for consequences. I take the group utility of an outcome o as the sum of power weighted individual utilities of o, i.e., SUM i p i U i(o) . This definition is supported by some new proposals about bargaining and coalitional stability.

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References

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© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Weirich, P. (1991). Group Decisions and Decisions for a Group. In: Chikán, A. (eds) Progress in Decision, Utility and Risk Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3146-9_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3146-9_24

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5387-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-3146-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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