Abstract
In this paper we remove the assumption of common knowledge of prior beliefs in games with incomplete information. Our proposal is to introduce the notion of semi-game and treat beliefs as control variables, subject to credibility constraints. We are able to define our equilibrium concept of sequential equilibrium in beliefs. We can provide a general existence theorem for signaling semi-games. We are able to prove that the equilibrium is generally not unique. The relationship between our equilibrium concept and those presented in recent literature is analyzed.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Brusco, S. and Tedeschi, P. (1988): “Sequential Equilibria in Semi-Games”, Quaderni di Ricerca, Istituto di Economia Politica, Università Bocconi n. 88–94.
Cho, I.: 1987, “A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium”, Econometrica, 55(5), 1368–1389.
Cho, I. and Kreps, D.: 1987, “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2), 181–221.
Grossman, S. and Perry, M.: 1986, “Perfect Sequential Equilibria”, Journal of Economic Theory, 39(1), 97–119.
Kuhn, H.W.: 1953, “Extensive Games and the Problem of Information”, in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. 2, ed. by H. Kuhn and A. Kucker. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Kreps, D. and Wilson, R.: 1982, “Sequential Equilibria”, Econometrica, 50(4), 863–894.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Brusco, S., Tedeschi, P. (1991). Sequential Equilibria in Beliefs In Semi-Games. In: Chikán, A. (eds) Progress in Decision, Utility and Risk Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3146-9_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3146-9_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5387-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-3146-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive