Abstract
Virtually every human activity involves a certain amount of risk, from walking downstairs and crossing the street to eating and breathing. Thus, the goal of a risk-free environment is meaningless, unless individuals are willing to cease all activity. We can, however, learn to manage risks more effectively. While some risk management is best conducted by individuals without the involvement of governments, other types of risks require a clear public-policy response.
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Segerson, K. (1992). The Policy Response to Risk and Risk Perceptions. In: Bromley, D.W., Segerson, K. (eds) The Social Response to Environmental Risk. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 24. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2954-1_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2954-1_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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