Wittgenstein, Following a Rule, and Scientific Psychology

Abstract

This paper’s topic is Wittgenstein’s remarks about following a rule and whether they are compatible with a scientific psychology. There will in fact be little about scientific psychology as such in it, but I hope that my remarks will bear upon this question, even though indirectly. At least, this is my motive in discussing what Wittgenstein and some of those who have commented on hirn have said. The subject is one on which I had no settled views, and I thought that it would be a good thing to try to make up my mind on the matter. At any rate, the prospect of presenting the paper has been a powerful stimulus to reading and thinking about the subject. Whether I shall have anything new to say about it is another matter. There have been differing views about what Wittgenstein had to say and about what he ought to have said. I have not managed to read all the literature on the subject, but from the considerable amount that I have read I get the impression that practically everything that could sensibly be said on this topic, whether true or false, must have been said by someone, somewhere or other. Having seen in the Times Literary Supplement (24 March 1985) Avishai Margalit’s very good review of Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning (1984),¹ and of G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Scepticism, Rules and Language (1984), I wondered whether in coming to Jerusalem I would not be bringing “coals to Newcastle.”