Abstract
Our modern conceptions of practical reason are shaped — I might say are distorted — by the weight of moral skepticism. Even conceptions which intend to give no ground to skepticism have frequently taken form in order to resist it best, or to offer the least possible purchase to it. In this, practical reason falls into line with a pervasive feature of modern intellectual culture, which one could call the primacy of the epistemological: the tendency to think out the question “what something is” in terms of the question “how it is known.”
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Taylor, C. (1992). Explanation and Practical Reason. In: Ullmann-Margalit, E. (eds) The Scientific Enterprise. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 146. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2688-5_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2688-5_12
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