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Aunty’s Own Argument for the Language of Thought

  • Martin Davies
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 52)

Abstract

Fodor has launched many arguments in Aunty’s direction since The Language of Thought (1975), and the assault has not ceased. Even since Psychosemantics (1987a), there has been Fodor and Pylyshyn’s (1988) attack on connectionism and its followers, amongst whom they number—qua “NewConnectionist Groupie” (Fodor 1987a,p. 139)—Aunty.

Keywords

Input State Semantic Content Semantic Description Syntactic Property Causal Systematicity 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin Davies
    • 1
  1. 1.Birkbeck CollegeUniversity of LondonEngland

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