Abstract
We intend to develop an account of the relation between particulars and universals. Loosely derived from the work of Thomas Reid,’ the account will be empiricist, in that it has our understanding of general concepts dependent upon our prior acquaintance with particular individuals, and it will be nominalist, in that it does not require that universals actually exist.
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Notes
Ibid., pp. 394–5.
Ibid., p. 395.
Of course, a hollow body still has a surface, and the body we are looking at might have had the same surface if it had been hollowed out.
Except in the sense that the surface of a grapefruit is the same as the exterior surface of the rind of the grapefruit.
Categories 1a20–29. J.L. Ackrill’s translation (Oxford: Clarendon Aristotle Series, 1963).
See especially Physics 193b31–194a13.
This account of how we arrive at general concepts is derived from the work of Eleanor Rosch.
Reid, p. 364.
Ibid., pp. 394–98, 405–10.
Ibid., p. 395.
There is an analogous principle governing individual relations, namely: (R1) q (∀ r)(r is an n-ary individual quality → (∀ x1)…(xn)(∀ 311)…(∀Yn)((<x1,…,xn> has r & <y1,…yn> has r) →> (x1 and y1 overlap mereologically &… & xn and yn overlap mereologically))).
The relational analogue is: (R2) q (∀r)(r is an n-ary individual relation → (∃x1)…(∃xn)<x1,…,xn> has r).
The relational analogue is: (R4) q (∀ x1)…(∀ xn)(∀ r)[(r is an n-ary individual relation & <x1,…,xn> has r) → (r exists → (at least part of x1 exists &… & at least part of xn exists))).
The relational analogue is: (R5) q (∀ x1)…(∀ x9)(∀r) ((r is an n-ary relation & <x1,…,x9> has r) → q (rexists → (∃ y1)…(∃ yn)(y1 is part of x1 &…& yn is part of xn & <y1,…yn> has r)).
The relational analogue is: (R6) q (∀ x1)…(∀ xn)(∀ r)[(r is an n-ary individual relation & <x1….,xn> has r)→ q (∀y1)…(∀ yn)((r exists & <y1,…,yn> has r) →(x1 and y1 overlap mereologically &…& xn and yn overlap mereologically))].
See pp. 319ff of “Naming and Necessity” in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1972), pp. 253–355.
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Lehrer, K., Mcgee, V. (1992). Particulars, Individual Qualities, and Universals. In: Mulligan, K. (eds) Language, Truth and Ontology. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 51. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2602-1_4
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