Abstract
Russell employed the term ‘logical atomism’ for his own philosophy when it was heavily under the influence of Wittgenstein, and it came to be also applied to the Tractatus. 1 It is now widely believed that logical atomism is untenable. But the differences between Russell and Wittgenstein show that the term `logical atomism’ is general, not singular. Possibly the objectionable aspects of their theories are not essential to logical atomism as such. I shall attempt to give a form of logical atomism which is both natural and plausible, suggest why it is an attractive view, and take steps in the direction of justifying it against standard objections.
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Simons, P. (1992). Logical Atomism and Its Ontological Refinement: A Defense. In: Mulligan, K. (eds) Language, Truth and Ontology. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 51. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2602-1_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2602-1_10
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