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Modalization and Modalities

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Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences

Part of the book series: Contributions to Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 8))

Abstract

In part I. of this essay we attempt to articulate Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions for the genesis of the primitive logical connectives, negation and disjunction. In part II. we describe possible worlds models for the use of disjunction and negation in epistemic contexts and contexts relating to the analysis of meanings. Finally, in part III, we try to show (a) how an appeal to Husserl’s analyses of modalization may buffer possible worlds theories of intentionality from charges that it is engaged in a metaphysically naive enterprise, and (b) how possible worlds methods of analysis may suggest an advisable tactical maneuver for Husserlian phenomenology in light of recent criticisms of Husserl’s philosophy of language.

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References

  1. Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, trans, by James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), section 21, esp. pp. 100–1 and sec. 66, pp. 272–3. (Hereafter, EJ.) Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen Zur Genealogie Der Logik (Hamburg: Classen Verlag, 1964), sec. 21, esp. p. 111 and sec. 66, pp. 326–8. (Hereafter, EU.)

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  29. For further suggestions on this theme see J. Hintikka and C. W. Harvey’s review of Smith and Mclntyre’s Husserl and Intentionality in Husserl Studies 1: 201–212 (1984).

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  31. This “restraint principle,” along with its correlative “principle of production,” is developed in C. W. Harvey, “Husserl’s Phenomenology and Possible Worlds Semantics: A Reexamination,” Husserl Studies 3: 191–207 (1986).

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  38. This theme is developed in C. W. Harvey, “Husserl’s Phenomenology and Possible Worlds Semantics”.

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  39. See, e. g., Jaakko Hintikka, The Intentions of Intentionality, ch. 10, essay of the same title (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975), p. 195.

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  40. This is Smith and McIntyre’s revealing phrase, ch. VI.

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  41. This point has been argued for more fully by Jaakko Hintikka in “Information, Causality, and the Logic of Perception,” in The Intentions of Intentionality, ch. 4, pp. 61—2.

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  50. The notion of a “pure” possible worlds approach to the analysis of meanings is used by D. Smith and R. Mclntyre, esp. ch. VII, sec. 1.3, to refer to possible worlds theories that do not explicitly acknowledge meanings and meaning-giving acts.

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  53. For Husserl’s notion of a transcendental clue see Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans, by Fred Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), sec. 149–50.

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  54. Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: Introduction to the Problem of Signs in Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans, by David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). Also see Derrida’s essay “Form and Meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of Language,” in the same volume. For another powerful version of this argument see Ross Harrison’s essay “The Concept of Prepredicative Experience,” in Edo Pivcević, ed., Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding (Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 93–107. And Susanne Cunningham develops a comparable, Wittgensteinian based argument in Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husserl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).

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Authors
  1. Charles Harvey
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  2. Jaakko Hintikka
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz, Germany

    Thomas M. Seebohm

  2. University of Oslo, Norway

    Dagfinn Føllesdal

  3. Temple University, Philadelphia, USA

    Jitendra Nath Mohanty

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© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Harvey, C., Hintikka, J. (1991). Modalization and Modalities. In: Seebohm, T.M., Føllesdal, D., Mohanty, J.N. (eds) Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2580-2_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2580-2_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5138-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-2580-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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