Abstract
The problem of justifying our beliefs, giving evidence for them, is central in Husserl’s phenomenology. In his writings he comes back again and again to the notions of justification and evidence.
This article springs from a project on Husserl’s Phenomenology which is presently supported by the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton. I gratefully acknowledge this support. I wish to thank Professor Morton G. White for helpful suggestions.
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References
Elizabeth Ströker, “Husserls Evidenzprinzip. Sinn und Grenzen einer methodischen Norm der Phänomenologie als Wissenschaft,” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 32 (1978), p. 4. English translation in Darrel E. Christensen et al., eds., Contemporary German Philosophy, Vol. 1 (1982), Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park and London, pp. 111–133. I have modified this translation, since it is defective on certain points.
Husserl-manuscript B IV, 2, p. 25. Quoted by Alwin Diemer, in Edmund Husserl. Versuch einer systematischen Darstellung seiner Phänomenologie (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, Band XV), Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan, 2. ed., 1965, p. 14, note 16.
Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1955 and later editions, especially pp. 62–64.
See in this connection the following studies of Mach and Husserl: Hermann Lübbe, “Positivismus und Phänomenologie (Mach und Husserl)”, in Beiträge zu Philosophie und Wissenschaft, W. Szilasi zum 70. Geburtstag, München I960, pp. 161–184; Klaus Düsing, “Das Problem der Denkökonomie bei Husserl und Mach,” in U. Claesges and K. Held (eds.), Perspektiven transzendentalphänomenologischer Forschung, für Ludwig Landgrebe zum 70. Geburtstag von seinen Kölner Schülern (Phaenomenologica 49), The Hague 1972, pp. 225–254; and especially Manfred Sommer, Husserl und der frühe Positivismus, Frankfurt am Main, 1985.
Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1955 and later editions, especially p. 64.
Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1955 and later editions, especially, pp. 63–64.
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Føllesdal, D. (1991). The Justification of Logic and Mathematics in Husserl’s Phenomenology . In: Seebohm, T.M., Føllesdal, D., Mohanty, J.N. (eds) Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2580-2_2
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