On Geometric Intentionality

Abstract

One of the crucial philosophical topics pursued by Husserl, and neglected by much of the tradition following Frege, is that of normative origins, that is, the rationale for the choice of mathematical concepts and first principles. The analytic tradition has had some difficulty finding a philosophical role for the generative or constitutive aspect of such choices. In The Origin of Geometry, Husserl concentrated on that aspect, seeking in it the basis for understanding meaning of mathematical theory. Professor Tragesser, in his recent book and in the current paper, is pursuing a related line.

Expanded response to R. S. Tragesser: Pons asinorum or how mathematics comes about, CARP Conference on Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences, Pittsburgh, September 26–29, 1985. References are to the original version, 1985.

University of Pittsburgh. The author gratefully acknowledges financial support by NSF Grant SES8511229, and the use of document production facilities made available by Dana Scott at Carnegie-Mellon University. However, views expressed are those of the author.