Abstract
Evaluative Theories take emotions to be evaluative beliefs or judgments which may cause emotional phenomena such as affective and bodily agitation and which may motivate behavior. Historically theories of this kind have been advocated by Chrysippus and other Stoics, Augustine, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Brentano. In recent philosophy examples are found in J.-P. Sartre (1939/1962), CD. Broad (1954/1971), R.S. Peters (1970), and Donald Davidson (1976/1980). The most fully developed version of the Evaluative Theory in current philosophy is that of Robert C. Solomon, who maintains that, “An emotion is an evaluative (or a ‘normative’) judgment, a judgment about my situation and about myself and/or about all other people” (Solomon, 1976, p. 187).
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© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Green, O.H. (1992). Evaluative Theories of Emotions. In: The Emotions. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 53. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2552-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2552-9_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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