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Confirmation Logic and Its Applications

  • Chao-Tien Lin
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 141)

Abstract

In this article ‘confirmation logic’ is first defined as ‘the underlying logic of any adequate confirmation theory’ and a confirmation theory is adequate if it satisfies the four conditions: (i) it can solve the paradoxes of confirmation as well as (ii) the Goodman paradox, (iii) the Equivalence Condition holds in it, (iv) the standard axiom system of probability can be derived from it if a definition of ‘degree of confirmation’ as ‘probability’ is defined in it.

It follows that Hempel’s theory of confirmation is not an adequate confirmation theory and its underlying logic, i.e., the classical 2-valucd quantificational logic is not a ‘confirmation logic’. The main business of this article is thus to construct a non-classical logic, in fact, a 3-valued quantificational logic (with a complete semantics) which is a ‘confirmation logic’.

Finally, the newly constructed confirmation logic is applied to solve a number of logical and philosophical puzzles and problems, among them: the Aristotelian problem of future contingents, the paradoxes of implication, the paradox of the existence of non-beings, the Kripkc paradox, and some other well-known problems.

Keywords

Quantificational Logic Truth Table Intuitionistic Logic Underlying Logic Individual Constant 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chao-Tien Lin

There are no affiliations available

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