Hempel on Inductive Shortcomings in Craigian Method

  • Cheng-Hung Lin
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 141)


Professor Carl G. Hempel argues in his ‘The theoretician’s dilemma: A study in the logic of theory construction’1 that a scientific theory establishes not only deductive relationships but also inductive relationships among observational sentences, and that the new theory reconstructed by means of Craigian method from a theory fails to preserve all those inductive relationships. In the present article, Hempel’s argument is analyzed in detail and rejected.


Logical Truth Theory Construction White Phosphorus Statistical Sentence Modify Principle 
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  1. Bohnert, H. G.: 1968, ‘In defense of Ramsey’s elimination method’, The Journal of Philosophy LXV, 275–281.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Hempel, C. G.: 1965, Theoretician’s dilemma: A study in the logic of theory construction’, in Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science ,New York, pp. 173–226.Google Scholar
  3. Hesse, M.: 1970, Theories and transitivity of confirmation’, Philosophy of Science 37, 50–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Niiniluoto, I. and Tuomela, R.: 1973, Theoretical Concepts and Hypothetico-Inductive Inference ,Holland.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Schlesinger, G.: 1974, Confirmation and Confirmability ,Oxford.Google Scholar

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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1993

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  • Cheng-Hung Lin

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