Abstract
In this article two confirmation theories whose underlying logics are two 3-valued logics are constructed. Theory Two can avoid the paradoxes of confirmation, while Theory One can only partially avoid the paradoxes. Theory Two is also claimed to avoid, in a sense, the Goodman paradox.
Reprinted from Philosophy of Science 45 (1978) 415–419 with permission of the author and the Philosophy of Science Association. Original version received July. 1977; revised December, 1977. The author would like to thank the referees [of Philosophy of Science] for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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References
Hempel, C. G.: 1965, ‘Studies in the logic of confirmation’, in Aspects of Scientific Explanation,The Free Press, New York, pp. 3–51.
Leblanc, H.: 1963, That positive instances are no help’, Journal of PhilosophyLX, 453–462
Wajsberg, M.: 1967, ‘Axiomatization of the three-valued propositional logic’, in S. McCall (ed.), Polish Logic: 1920–1939,Oxford, pp. 264–284.
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Lin, CT. (1993). Solutions to the Paradoxes of Confirmation, Goodman’s Paradox, and Two New Theories of Confirmation. In: Lin, CH., Fu, D. (eds) Philosophy and Conceptual History of Science in Taiwan. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 141. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2500-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2500-0_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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