Solutions to the Paradoxes of Confirmation, Goodman’s Paradox, and Two New Theories of Confirmation

  • Chao-Tien Lin
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 141)


In this article two confirmation theories whose underlying logics are two 3-valued logics are constructed. Theory Two can avoid the paradoxes of confirmation, while Theory One can only partially avoid the paradoxes. Theory Two is also claimed to avoid, in a sense, the Goodman paradox.


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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1993

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  • Chao-Tien Lin

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